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DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN THE EARLY YEARS OF LIFE IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE CHILD-MOTHER RELATIONSHIP 
 
Abstract 
Objective: The aim of this PhD is twofold: 1) To investigate whether infant joint attention at 
10 months is developmentally linked to later social symbolic play abilities at 3 years of age, 
as both are thought to be milestones of social cognition; and 2) To explore individual, 
relational and contextual contributions to joint attention and social symbolic play. Method: 
Fifty-two infants were assessed at 10 months for joint attention (following and initiating joint 
attention behaviors) in interaction with their mothers. At 3 years of age, 49 children were re-
assessed, this time focusing on their social symbolic play abilities with an experimenter. 
Information regarding other relevant variables was also gathered at both ages. At 10 months 
infants’ expression of negative emotionality, temperament and developmental level were 
assessed. Data on mother-infant relationship quality, maternal bids for joint attention 
(entertaining, teaching and attention directing behaviors) and social-demographic features 
were also collected. At 3 years, we assessed children’s temperament, verbal and non-verbal 
abilities, as well mothers’ and children’s mental state talk in a shared pretend play interaction 
and maternal mind-mindedness is a short interview. Relevant social-demographic information 
was also collected. Results: At 10 months, following joint attention was exclusively predicted 
by total maternal bids for joint attention, although marginal associations were found with 
maternal entertaining and attention-directing behaviors (but not teaching strategies). Initiating 
joint attention was predicted by infants’ low expression of negative emotionality and the 
presence of older siblings, as well as marginally predicted by less maternal teaching 
behaviors. At age 3, children’s social symbolic play abilities were not significantly predicted 
by infant joint attention. Conversely, social symbolic play was significantly predicted by 
children’s verbal abilities and their use of desire references in a shared pretense interaction 
with their mothers. Finally, we also found specific associations between children’s references 
to desires and their social symbolic play, and between children’s references to cognitions and 
their general cognitive development. Conclusion: Findings highlight the importance of a 
multilevel approach to the study of social cognition through infancy to preschool years, one 
that encompasses not only individual variables, but also a variety of social influences. 
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DESENVOLVIMENTO DA COGNIÇÃO SOCIAL NOS PRIMEIROS ANOS DE 
VIDA NO CONTEXTO RELACIONAL COM A FIGURA MATERNA 
 
Resumo 
Objectivo: Este projecto de doutoramento tem dois objectivos principais: 1) Investigar se a 
atenção partilhada aos 10 meses está desenvolvimentalmente associada à competência 
simbólica social aos 3 anos de idade; e 2) Explorar os contributos individuais, relacionais e 
contextuais para a atenção partilhada e o jogo simbólico social. Método: Cinquenta e dois 
bebés foram avaliados aos 10 meses ao nível da atenção partilhada (comportamentos de 
seguir e iniciar atenção partilhada) com as suas mães. Aos 3 anos, 49 crianças foram 
reavaliadas ao nível do seu jogo simbólico social com um experimentador. Foi ainda 
recolhida informação adicional relevante nas duas idades. Aos 10 meses avaliámos a 
expressão de emocionalidade negativa, o temperamento e o nível de desenvolvimento dos 
bebés. Foram igualmente recolhidos dados acerca da qualidade da relação mãe-bebé, das 
estratégias maternas de atenção partilhada (comportamentos orientados para entreter, ensinar 
ou dirigir a atenção do bebé) e de características sócio-demográficas. Aos 3 anos avaliámos o 
temperamento e a capacidade verbal e não-verbal das crianças, assim como o uso de palavras 
mentais por parte da mãe e da criança no decurso de uma brincadeira de faz-de-conta, e a 
mind-mindedness materna numa pequena entrevista. Foram ainda recolhidos dados relativos a 
variáveis sócio-demográficas de relevância. 
Resultados: Aos 10 meses, apenas o total de estratégias maternas de atenção partilhada foi 
um preditor significativo do seguimento de atenção partilhada por parte do bebé. No entanto, 
encontrámos associações marginalmente significativas entre o seguir da atenção partilhada e 
as estratégias da mãe destinadas a entreter o bebé e a direccionar a sua atenção (mas não 
estratégias com o objectivo de lhe ensinar algo). O iniciar da atenção partilhada foi 
significativamente predito pela baixa expressão de emocionalidade negativa do bebé, pela 
presença de irmãos mais velhos, e marginalmente predito por menos comportamentos 
maternos com a intenção de ensinar algo ao bebé. Aos 3 anos, verificámos que a atenção 
partilhada na infância não era um preditor significativo das competências de jogo simbólico 
social. Em contraste, a capacidade verbal e o uso de palavras relativas a desejos por parte da 
criança foram preditores significativos do seu jogo simbólico social. Por último, encontrámos 
associações específicas entre as referências a desejos por parte da criança e o seu jogo 
simbólico social, e entre as referências a cognições e o seu desenvolvimento cognitivo global. 
Conclusão: Os dados sublinham a importância de uma abordagem multinível ao estudo da 
 x 
 
cognição social nos primeiros anos de vida, uma abordagem que englobe não apenas variáveis 
individuais, mas igualmente uma variedade de influências sociais. 
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Social Cognition in Infancy and Preschool Years 
The emergence of social cognition is one of the most defining features of human 
development (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998). It regards the gradual acquisition of 
skills that allow children to acknowledge and interpret one’s own and others’ social cues and, 
in turn, to react to them. It is not surprising then, that social cognition brings about particular 
advantages in everyday social situations (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). Several empirical 
studies have shown that better social understanding is associated with superior social skills, 
including better language (Astington, 2001), less conflict (Dunn & Cutting, 1999) and more 
cooperative behavior with peers (Astington, 2001; Lalonde & Chandler, 1995), as well as 
increased popularity (Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002). The importance of social 
cognition is also evident in the striking interpersonal deficits that result from the social 
communicative impairments that characterize autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  
In recent years developmental researchers have been dedicated to the study of early 
social cognition from infancy through preschool years, suggesting that joint attention and 
social symbolic play may be two essential milestones along which typically developing 
children advance, culminating in the acquisition of a theory of mind in late preschool years 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Leslie, 1987; Rakoczy, 2008; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; Youngblade 
& Dunn, 1995). 
 
Joint attention. 
From very early on infants display preference for human faces and stimuli (Morton & 
Johnson, 1991; Rochat & Striano, 1999) as well as pro-social behaviors, such as pre-speech 
movements, which suggest a predisposition for communication and sociability (Trevarthen, 
1979). However, it is not until the final quarter of the first year of life that infants participate 
in triadic interactions, in which they share attention with another person towards an external 
object or event (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Carpenter et al., 1998; Mundy & Acra, 2006). 
In their pioneer empirical work, Bakeman and Adamson (1984) described how 
coordinated joint engagement emerges at around 9 months of age, and expands rapidly 
thereafter. A key behavior, and sine qua non condition, in such episodes is the infant’s 
alternation of gaze between the object and the mother, attesting his/her awareness of the 
active role they are both playing in that triadic interaction. Carpenter et al. (1998) further 
contributed to this field of study by defining three major categories of infant joint attention: 
sharing, following, and directing attention. Sharing attention corresponds to the relatively 
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extended periods of time during which infant and adult share attention towards an object or 
event. Following and directing attention, on the other hand, comprise discrete behaviors that 
can potentially trigger episodes of shared attention. Thus, following attention takes place 
when the infant redirects his/her attention to the focus indicated by the partner (e.g., by 
following direction of mother's pointing gesture). Conversely, directing attention entails the 
infant’s use of communicative gestures with the aim of capturing and directing the partner’s 
attention to a new focus (e.g., offering a toy or pointing to a distant one). In the same line of 
thought, Mundy et al. (2003) outlined two major categories of infant joint attention: 
responding to joint attention (RJA) and initiating joint attention (IJA). RJA corresponds to 
Carpenter and colleagues’ following attention and therefore reflects the infant’s ability to 
follow the gaze and conventional gestures (such as pointing) of the social partner. IJA, on the 
other hand, collapses sharing and directing attention, and indexes the infant’s tendency to use 
gaze and conventional gestures to initiate joint attention with the partner for the purpose of 
social sharing.  
Despite the differences, these behaviors all seem to have one common denominator: 
the monitoring and sharing of attention with another person towards an object. In the words of 
Carpenter and colleagues, they represent “the initial meeting of the minds” (1998, p. 2). 
In what concerns the transition from dyadic to triadic interactions, joint attention 
behaviors are believed to be preceded by less sophisticated bouts of parallel attention 
(Gaffan, Martins, Healy, & Murray, 2010) emerging at about 6 months. Parallel attention 
takes place when infant and partner both attend to the same focus. However, a key distinction 
from joint attention is that the infant does not alternate gaze between object and partner, 
therefore either showing no recognition that both are sharing attention towards that object or, 
at least showing no overt signs that he/she recognizes such sharing.  
 
Social symbolic play. 
The development of symbolic play has drawn vast scientific attention because of its 
unique contribution to several areas of child development, namely social cognition. Two 
prominent theorists greatly influenced research on this particular field. On the one hand, 
Vygostky’s (1966) pioneer account suggests that symbolic play consists of an exercise of 
representational thought allowing the child to separate the meanings from the actions and the 
objects that originated them. Leslie (1987) on the other hand, was among the first to suggest a 
link between pretend play and subsequent theory of mind, highlighting how both share the 
ability of metarepresentation. Emerging at around the second year of life, pretend play 
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involves the conscious and simultaneous representation of reality and its fantasy alternatives – 
a banana can be a telephone (Bornstein, Haynes, O'Reilly, & Painter, 1996). However, it is 
only in the course of the third year that children acquire a full-fledged ability to pretend as 
they are now capable of mentally generating symbolic activity in a planned manner, 
coordinating two or more representational structures (McCune-Nicolich, 1981). Moreover, it 
is also at this age that symbolic play with a partner, be it a peer or an adult, starts occurring 
with increasing frequency. Social symbolic play is thought to exercise two distinct levels of 
social cognition (Lillard, 1998). The first level – out-of-frame –consists of the negotiation and 
assignment of roles and behaviors prior to the pretend play itself. The second level – within-
frame – regards the pretense activity per se and involves the coordination of the different 
symbolic perspectives. Shared symbolic experiences can therefore be considered growth 
opportunities in which children practice and master the ability to articulate their own 
symbolic perspectives with the views of others, a skill that will be very useful for subsequent 
social cognition (Leslie, 1987; Meins & Russell, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). This 
view also brings to attention the Vygotskian notion of zone of proximal development (1978), 
by which interaction with more experienced and able partners could promote higher 
competence and sophistication in children’s symbolic abilities (Dunn & Dale, 1984; 
Youngblade & Dunn, 1995).  
 
Theory of mind. 
At about 4 years of age the development of social cognition is marked by the 
emergence of theory of mind – an essential milestone that allows children to predict and 
explain other people’s behaviors by taking into account their mental states (Astington & 
Barriault, 2001; Martins, Osório, & Macedo, 2008). This new understanding of the mental 
world endows the child with a variety of internal states with which to explain everyday 
interpersonal and psychological events. Up to the present, children’s ability to impute false 
beliefs received the largest share of research attention as it is widely accepted to reflect the 
ability to understand mental representations of reality as subjective. In the classical 
assessment protocol devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), the child is presented with a 
story in which a protagonist places an object in a certain location, leaves and does not witness 
its change to a new location. Upon return, the naïve protagonist will look for the object. By 
the age of 4, children begin to understand that the protagonist will search for the object where 
it was initially put. By imputing a false belief to the protagonist, children show they 
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understand that people can think and act upon expectations that do not reflect reality, the first 
sign of a mature theory of mind (Hala & Carpendale, 1997).  
As theory of mind is out of the scope of this project, we will not refer to it in depth any 
further. 
 
 
Joint Attention and Social Symbolic Play: Two Steps on the Pathway Towards a Mature 
Understanding of the Mind? 
Joint attention and social symbolic play have been conceptualized as precursors of 
theory of mind. On the one hand, some hypothesized that the ability to understand intentions, 
reflected by joint attention skills, is fundamental to the later understanding of beliefs – the 
pivotal feature of a mature theory of mind (Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops, & Perucchini, 2008; 
Tomasello et al., 2005). Indeed, empirical studies with normative and atypical samples have 
shown early joint attention skills to be associated with later theory of mind (e.g., Charman et 
al., 2000; Nelson, Adamson, & Bakeman, 2008). On the other hand, the ability to exchange 
symbolic perspectives (real world vs. fantasy alternatives) in the context of social pretend 
play has also been considered to underpin the later developing theory of mind. Once again, 
empirical support has been found, as children who are more frequently involved in social 
symbolic play tend to perform better at later theory of mind tasks (e.g., Charman et al., 2000; 
Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). 
However, joint attention in infancy and social symbolic play in early preschool years 
share among them a relevant similarity that goes beyond the link to theory of mind – both 
entail the ability to manage the perspective of a social partner. As stated above, infant joint 
attention regards the ability to coordinate (follow or direct) visual attention with others to 
external objects or events (Tomasello, 1995), while social symbolic play involves the 
coordination of one’s own and other’s symbolic perspectives (Lillard, 1998). We can 
therefore hypothesize a longitudinal link between these two milestones. Children who 
displayed more frequent joint attention behaviors in infancy may have had more experiences 
in dealing with self and other’s intentionality (Tomasello, 1995), thus becoming more 
competent at integrating other people’s symbolic play suggestions.  
Yet, to date very few empirical studies have confirmed this theoretical premise. In 
fact, research in autism provides some indirect evidence of a link between joint attention and 
symbolic play, with severe impairments in both abilities being key elements of a diagnosis of 
autism in the early years (Baron-Cohen, Allen, & Gillberg, 1992). Conversely, a small-scale 
General Introduction 
7 
 
study with typically developing children conducted by Charman et al. (2000) has successfully 
established a longitudinal association between joint attention at 20 months and later theory of 
mind at 44 months, as well as concurrent associations between joint attention and solitary 
symbolic play. However, the possibility of a longitudinal link between joint attention and 
social symbolic play in typically developing three-year-olds remains untested.  
 
 
What Predicts Joint Attention and Social Symbolic Play: The Unique Role of Social 
Experience 
Apart from uncovering timings and qualitative aspects of the normative and atypical 
development of social cognition, as well as to comparing and contrasting them, research on 
child development has been increasingly concerned with its possible predictors. Because the 
development of an understanding of mind is essentially an interpersonal process, embedded 
within a social context, particular emphasis must be placed on social experience as its driving 
force. Carpendale and Lewis (2004) have contended that “the extent and nature of the social 
interaction children experience will influence the development of children’s social 
understanding” (p. 79). Indeed, there is ample evidence of the impact of several social factors 
such as presence of older siblings (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998), 
maternal scaffolding of infant’s play (Vaughan et al., 2003), and use of mental state talk in 
mother-child interactions (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002) on various milestones of social 
cognition. Although in this study we have also looked at relevant individual and social-
demographic variables, our main focus was on the relations established by the infant/child and 
the decisive social partner in the first years of life – the mother. Thus, our work was centered 
on behaviors and speech occurring in the context of mother-child interactions as predictors of 
joint attention in infancy and social symbolic play at 3 years of age. 
 
 
Goals of the Present Work 
As mentioned earlier, social cognition can be regarded as the understanding of how 
our minds and behaviors affect the way we (inter)act with others. This understanding, like all 
other aspects of development, does not emerge at once but most likely evolves from basic to 
complex forms, being influenced by diverse factors in the process. 
In the present PhD project, we aimed at investigating how such evolution comes about 
from infancy through to age 3 years. Two central questions guided our work: 
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1. Is joint attention at 10 months developmentally linked to later social symbolic play 
abilities at 3 years of age, as both are thought to represent social-cognitive milestones? 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to empirically attempt to validate a 
longitudinal link between these two accepted milestones of social cognition in first three years 
of life. 
2. What individual, relational and contextual factors make their unique contribution to 
joint attention and social symbolic play? 
In our choice of potential explanatory variables we placed particular emphasis on 
social experiences as the impetus of social cognitive development. Therefore, the developing 
child’s social experiences assume a particular role that must be investigated and clarified as 
much as possible. 
 
This dissertation is composed of three papers: 
 
Paper 1 was titled Individual, Relational and Contextual Contributions to Parallel 
and Joint Attention in Infancy (cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation). This paper was aimed at 
characterizing infants’ parallel and joint attention, as well as to further the knowledge on the 
contributions of individual, relational and contextual contributions to individual differences in 
infants’ attention. This study had a cross-sectional design, as outcomes and potential 
explanatory variables were measured concurrently. 
The specific research questions were: 
a. Are there individual differences in 10-month-old infants’ parallel and joint 
attention? 
b. Is parallel attention associated with joint attention? 
c. Are the two types of infant joint attention - following and initiating behaviors – 
linked? 
d. What are the independent contributions of maternal joint attention behaviors, 
mother-infant relationship quality, and infant temperament and negative 
emotionality to infants’ parallel and joint attention? 
 
Paper 2 was titled Testing Joint Attention in Infancy and Mother-Child Mental State 
Talk in Shared Pretense as Predictors of Children’s Social Symbolic Play Abilities at Age 3 
(cf. Chapter 3). We aimed at investigating whether there was a longitudinal link between early 
joint attention behaviors and later social symbolic play, as well as the potential role of 
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mothers’ and children’s mental state talk as concurrent predictors of social symbolic play. 
This study had a longitudinal design: joint attention behaviors were assessed in infancy (10 
months) whereas social symbolic play and mental state talk were assessed at 3 years of age. 
This paper’s specific research questions were: 
a. Do joint attention behaviors in infancy influence later social symbolic play? 
b. What aspects of child-mother speech influence social symbolic play? 
i. Does maternal mental state talk have an impact on children’s social 
symbolic play? 
ii. Does children’s mental state talk have an impact on children’s social 
symbolic play? 
 
Paper 3 was titled “Let’s Go to the Beach”: Mental State Talk in Mother-Child 
Shared Pretense and its Relation to Mothers’ Mind-Mindedness and Children’s Social-
Cognitive and Cognitive Outcomes (cf. Chapter 4). In this paper we began by exploring the 
links between mothers’ mind-mindedness in a short interview and maternal mental state talk 
in interaction with the child. A second aim was to investigate individual differences in 
mothers’ as well as children’s mental state talk and how they covaried. In addition, we sought 
to explore the associations between mind-related speech and two developmental outcomes: 
social-cognitive and cognitive development. This study was cross-sectional. 
This paper’s aimed at answering the following specific research questions: 
a. Are mothers’ mentalistic descriptions of their 3-year-olds concurrently related 
to maternal use of mental state talk when interacting with their children in a 
shared pretend play task? 
b. Are there links between use of mental state talk by mothers and their 3-year-
olds in a shared pretend play task? 
c. Are mothers’ and children’s use of mind-related terms associated to children’s 
social symbolic play as well as cognitive development? 
 
A fourth paper was written in the course of this PhD project. Thus, in Appendix I we 
have included a methodological review paper written in Portuguese titled Metodologias de 
Avaliação do Desenvolvimento da Cognição Social da Infância até à Idade Pré-Escolar. 
The goals of this paper were twofold. On the one hand, we aimed at providing a brief 
theoretical overview on the development of social cognition from infancy to the preschool 
years, focusing on three milestones of social development: joint attention, social symbolic 
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play, and theory of mind. As mentioned before, the latter was not studied in the scope of this 
PhD dissertation. On the other hand, we proposed some examples of observational assessment 
protocols and coding schemes. This paper was intended to assist Portuguese speaking 
researchers interested in the field of social cognition in the early years of life as it associates 
theoretical perspectives with empirical assessment suggestions.  
 
Finally, we would like to mention a methodological consideration regarding this 
project. One specific feature of the three empirical studies presented here regards the fact that 
all relied heavily on observational data. From outcomes to potential explanatory variables, 
nearly all variables included in this study involved extensive coding after data collection, 
which, in turn, resulted in substantial effort being put into training and inter-rater reliability. 
Although such methodological choices were particularly time- and resource-consuming, we 
believed that the resulting variables would provide a more accurate and ecologically valid 
picture than other methodologies such as questionnaires.  
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Individual, Relational, and Contextual Contributions to Parallel and Joint Attention 
in Infancy 
 
Abstract 
 
Objective: This study examined the contributions of maternal bids for joint attention, 
relationship quality, infant characteristics, and social-demographic features to individual 
differences in infants’ parallel and joint attention. Method: Fifty-two 10-month-olds and their 
mothers were assessed in order to investigate concurrent predictors of infant parallel attention, 
following joint attention, and initiating joint attention. Results: Parallel attention was 
predicted by infants’ higher mental development, low expression of negative emotionality, 
and maternal entertaining behaviors. Following joint attention was exclusively predicted by 
total maternal bids for joint attention, although marginal associations were found with 
maternal entertaining and maternal attention-directing behaviors (but not teaching strategies). 
Initiating joint attention was predicted by the infants’ low expression of negative emotionality 
and the presence of older siblings, as well as marginally predicted by less maternal teaching 
behaviors. Conclusion: These results further the understanding of the factors influencing 
infant parallel as well as joint attention. 
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In the final quarter of the first year of life infants begin to participate in triadic 
interactions, in which they share attention towards an object with another person (Bakeman & 
Adamson, 1984). Joint attention can therefore take place when the infant follows attention 
towards an object or event indicated by the social partner (e.g., by following direction of 
mother's pointing gesture), or when it is the own infant who uses communicative gestures to 
capture and direct the partner’s attention (e.g., offering a toy or pointing to a distant one) 
(Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998; Mundy et al., 2003).  
Infants’ ability to coordinate attention with a social partner has been argued to be 
important for the development of representational abilities such as language and play (e.g., 
Adamson, Bakeman, & Deckner, 2004; Carpenter et al., 1998; Delgado et al., 2002; McCune, 
1995; Morales, Mundy, & Rojas, 1998). Indeed, problems in engaging in joint attention have 
been identified as an early marker for subsequent language and social-cognitive impairment in 
child populations at risk of developmental disorders, namely autism (Dawson et al., 2004; 
Mundy & Neal, 2001; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; Ulvund & Smith, 1996; Yoder, Warren, & 
McCathren, 1998).  
While previous research has investigated relations between joint attention and early 
cognitive development (e.g., Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 2008; 
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986), few studies have addressed the social-emotional correlates and 
developmental outcomes of this capacity. Research considering social outcomes of joint 
attention (e.g., social competence, behavioral regulation, behavior problems, peer interaction) 
has relied on teacher or parental report during the preschool years (e.g., Sheinkopf, Mundy, 
Claussen, & Willoughby, 2004; Van Hecke et al., 2007), with little attention paid to how 
children’s earlier or concurrent social-emotional development relates to their joint attention 
abilities. This neglect is striking for a number of reasons. First, the act of engaging in object-
based attention with others is fundamentally an interpersonal process, embedded within a 
social context (Striano & Reid, 2006). Second, there are clear theoretical arguments for a link 
between the establishment of the child’s first social relationships and object-centered social 
exchanges. For example, Trevarthen and Hubley (1978) argued that the ability to engage in 
triadic joint attention (where caregiver and infant both direct their attention to an object) is the 
“developmental heir” of earlier dyadic social exchanges (where caregiver directs attention to 
infant while infant directs attention to caregiver). Finally, dyadic social attention is thought to 
promote the emergence of triadic joint attention as it offers a social context within which the 
caregiver can scaffold infant attention (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). 
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In an early small-scale study, Bakeman and Adamson (1984) found some support for 
such a longitudinal relation, describing how infants’ dyadic attention with a social partner 
(face-to-face) declines between the ages of 6 and 18 months whereas their coordinated joint 
engagement (where infant coordinates attention both to a social partner and an object) 
increases over the same time period. Subsequent research on joint attention has paid little 
attention to how dyadic social engagement related to more sophisticated forms of object-
based joint attention. For example, one of the most well established and widely used 
assessments of joint attention, the Early Social Communication Scales (ESCS: Mundy et al., 
2003; Seibert, Hogan, & Mundy, 1982), assesses only object-focused joint attention, 
distinguishing between infants’ tendency to respond to an experimenter’s bid for joint 
attention, and infants’ own initiations of joint attention either for the purpose of social sharing 
or to help them achieve a goal such a reaching a toy.  
One exception to the exclusive focus on object-based joint attention is a recent study 
by Gaffan, Martins, Healy, and Murray (2010) who coined the term parallel attention to 
describe interactions where both infant’s and caregiver’s attention is focused on the same 
object, but the infant displays no explicit recognition that he/she is sharing attention with a 
social partner. Gaffan et al. (2010) reported that time spent in parallel attention with the 
mother at 6 months was positively related to shared attention with an experimenter at 9 
months, which goes  in line with Bakeman and Adamson’s suggestion (1984). The first aim of 
the present study was then to describe parallel attention, following joint attention, and 
initiating joint attention in a normative sample of 10 month-olds in interaction with their 
mothers. To date, very few studies have included measures of parallel attention, an index of 
infant attention thought to be involved in, or even a precursor of joint attention (Bakeman & 
Adamson, 1984; Gaffan et al., 2010). Therefore, our second aim was to assess whether 
parallel attention was significantly associated with joint attention - following and initiating.  
Different models of joint attention have been put forward, with two major theories 
leading current efforts in research – a model emphasizing the social-cognitive nature of joint 
attention (Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and the 
multiple process model (Mundy, Card, & Fox, 2000). The former proposes that understanding 
of intentions by infants underpins their ability to share attention with other people. Therefore, 
measures of different joint attention behaviors (following and initiating) are expected to be 
intercorrelated, as well as to correlate with similar sets of variables (Tomasello, 1995). This 
model has received support from various studies that evidenced social cognition as a common 
source of variance for distinct joint attention skills (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005; Carpenter et 
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al., 1998). In contrast, the multiple process model advocates that manifold executive and 
social motivation processes influence joint attention abilities and later social-cognitive 
development (Mundy et al., 2007). According to this model, no intercorrelations are expected 
across the different measures of joint attention, and each should be associated with a specific 
set of explanatory variables. This model has also received empirical support (Mundy et al., 
2007; Vaughan et al., 2003), including research describing different patterns of brain activity 
associated with different dimensions of joint attention (Caplan et al., 1993; Henderson, Yoder, 
Yale, & McDuffie, 2002). A third aim of this study was therefore to analyze whether 
following and initiating joint attention were intercorrelated, given that researchers disagree on 
this specific aspect (Mundy et al., 2000; Tomasello, 1995).  
Empirical research has also focused on identifying correlates and predictors of infant 
attention skills. Two major lines of evidence provided support for the role of early mother–
infant experiences in explaining individual differences in infant attention. One line of 
evidence comes from studies devoted to the impact of specific maternal behaviors intended to 
draw infant’s attention. For instance, Vaughan et al. (2003) reported that appropriate caregiver 
scaffolding in toy-play at 9 months was significantly associated with infant joint attention 
with the experimenter at 12 months. More specifically, Gaffan et al. (2010) found maternal 
teaching behaviors such as pointing or demonstrating at 6 months to predict shared attention 
with the mother at 9 months, and less maternal entertaining behaviors such as animating a toy 
or teasing with contact at 9 months to significantly predict infants’ concurrent initiating joint 
attention behaviors. We sought to expand these recent findings of Gaffan et al. (2010) by also 
including a measure of following joint attention, therefore analyzing the possible roles of 
specific maternal behaviors as predictors of infant parallel attention, as well as following and 
initiating joint attention.  
A second line of evidence suggests a link between infant joint attention and more 
general maternal interactive styles. Maternal sensitivity (Hobson, Patrick, Crandell, Perez, & 
Lee, 2004) and responsiveness (Landry, Smith, & Swank, 2006) were found to be linked to 
infants’ increased triadic communication. Thus, evidence from both perspectives converges to 
suggest that mothers who are better able to adapt their behavior to their infants’ attentional 
rhythms may promote infant parallel and joint attention by providing the necessary structure 
to the infants’ developing attention skills. In order to explore the relation between maternal 
interactive behavior, infant characteristics, and infant joint attention in more detail, the study 
reported here included a measure of emotional availability, and focused on the period in the 
first year of life when infants’ joint attention abilities begin to emerge. Emotional availability 
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(Easterbrooks & Biringen, 2005) regards the ability to express a range of positive and 
negative emotions as well as to attune and respond to the partner’s emotionality. We chose 
emotional availability as an index of quality of interaction as it indexes both infant and 
mother behaviors. We hypothesized that better relationship quality, reflected by more 
emotional availability, would relate to higher levels of parallel and joint attention.  
However, quite often previous studies did not take into account the influence of the 
infants’ own behaviors which are known to relate to joint attention abilities. For example, 
Vaughan et al. (2003) reported relations between infant temperamental traits and joint 
attention. Parental report of smiling and laughter was positively related to 9-month-olds’ 
concurrent initiating joint attention behaviors with an experimenter, and distress was 
positively related to concurrent initiating behaviors with the caregiver. Infant’s tendency to 
share positive affect with the mother was also associated with infant engagement in joint 
attention at 12 and 18 months (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985). Additionally, Striano and 
Rochat (1999) uncovered associations between infants’ social initiatives in a dyadic context 
and joint attention behaviors with an experimenter in a sample of 7- and 10-months-olds. 
These studies lend empirical support to the notion that individual temperamental 
characteristics could play a crucial role in infants’ involvement in episodes of intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). In the present study we investigated the independent 
contributions of temperament to infant parallel attention, following and initiating joint 
attention.  
Above and beyond temperament differences, the adaptive value of the infants’ 
emergent ability to regulate negative emotionality may play an important role in their nascent 
joint attention skills. More specifically, links between infant attention and negative emotion 
regulation have been uncovered, underscoring how attentional mechanisms can contribute to 
the regulation of distress. The cross-sectional study by Raver (1996) was among the first to 
uncover such a link, as toddlers’ time spent in joint attention with their mothers was found to 
relate to their ability for emotion self-regulation. In a recent longitudinal study, infant gaze-
following at 6 months was found to predict more self-directed and less comfort seeking 
emotion regulation strategies at 24 months (Morales, Mundy, Crowson, Neal, & Delgado, 
2005). However, it is also conceivable that infants’ negative emotionality interferes with their 
ability to explore the environment (Kopp, 1989), therefore hindering the occurrence of 
parallel and joint attention. High expression of negative emotionality may be considered a 
result of less optimal emotion regulation strategies (Raver, 1996), which may in turn have 
diminished the infant’s preceding opportunities to engage in parallel and joint attention. 
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Indeed, some have suggested that emotional mechanisms are involved in the ability to detect 
direction of gaze and occurrence of eye contact (Adolphs, 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; 
Kawashima et al., 1999). Thus, it may be the case that negative emotionality is a cause rather 
than an effect of diminished joint attention.  
In summary, several hypotheses were examined in this study. Firstly, we expected 
significant associations to emerge between parallel attention and both indices of joint 
attention, following and initiating. In contrast, and due to diverging empirical data (e.g., 
Mundy et al., 2000; Tomasello, 1995) we did not make any specific hypotheses concerning 
existence and/or direction of links between following and initiating behaviors. Moreover, we 
expected maternal entertaining, teaching, and attention-directing behaviors to play distinct 
roles in the prediction of parallel and joint attention abilities. We also hypothesized that better 
relationship quality, reflected by more emotional availability, would relate to higher levels of 
parallel and joint attention. In what concerns infant variables, we expected difficult 
temperament to predict lower parallel and joint attention skills. Finally, with respect to the 
relation between infant negative emotionality and joint attention behaviors, if negative 
emotionality plays a causal role in children’s joint attention abilities, early in development 
one would expect high expression of negative emotionality to relate to lower levels of parallel 
and joint attention. However, if the opposite direction of cause and effect obtains, infant 
negative emotionality and attention behaviors might be unrelated.  
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 52 mother–infant dyads (31 boys, 59.6%) recruited from child-care 
centers from a large city in the north of Portugal who were participating in a study on child 
development. Infants were aged 9 to 11 months (M = 10.38, SD = 0.36). Twenty-six (50%) 
were singletons and the remainder had one or two older siblings. All infants had 5 min 
APGAR scores ≥ 8, none was diagnosed with a developmental disability, and the mean 
gestation period was 38.1 weeks (SD = 1.68). Mothers were aged 24 to 45 years (M = 33.45, 
SD = 4.76), married or cohabiting. Concerning maternal education, the majority (65.4%; n = 
34) had higher education qualifications, while the remaining 34.6% (n = 18) had completed 
between 5 and 12 years of formal education. All participants were White and had Portuguese 
as their first language. 
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Procedure 
The 52 dyads were visited in their homes when infants were aged around 10 months. 
During this visit, mother–infant interactions were video recorded and mothers completed a 
questionnaire regarding infant’s temperament. About two weeks after the home visit, a visit to 
the infant’s childcare centre was scheduled and their developmental level was assessed.  
The home-based observations had an approximate duration of 40 minutes. In the first 
20 minutes, mothers were asked to behave as naturally as possible so that she and the baby 
became comfortable with the presence of the researcher. Mothers were then asked to play 
with their infants as they normally would with the baby’s favorite toys, allowing for a 10-
minute toy-play session to be recorded. Following this period of play, mothers were requested 
to teach their infants how to play with a shape sorter. This task lasted 10 minutes and the toy 
was considered to be above the infant’s current developmental level.  
 
Parallel and Joint Attention Behaviors. 
The 10-minute toy-play interaction was coded using an adaptation of the joint 
attention scheme designed by Martins (2003). We opted to code the unstructured toy play 
session as it provided a more naturalistic context for joint attention behaviors to occur. This 
coding scheme was especially developed for the microanalytic assessment of joint attention in 
mother–infant play sessions. The original coding scheme included both event- and duration-
behavioral codes. However, because the videos were not originally made to assess joint 
attention, we were unable to reliably code the duration of the episodes as those rely on the 
microanalytic observation of the direction of infant’s and mother’s gaze. Therefore, only the 
frequency of joint attention behaviors was coded. The occurrence of efforts to draw the 
partner’s attention to a target (usually a toy) and the infant’s responses to maternal bids for 
joint attention were the focus of the coding and included the following behaviors:  
a) Mother’s bids for joint attention. 
The frequency of seven behaviors was coded: engaging with contact (playfully 
touching the infant with the toy); animating a toy (expressive performances to entertain the 
infant - e.g., rattling or moving the toy); showing a toy to the infant; offering the toy, pointing 
(index finger extended towards a target); demonstrating an action (modeling specific actions 
for the infant to perform); and verbal directives (verbally encouraging the infant to direct the 
attention towards a target using directives, prompt questions/suggestions or even questions 
about the location of the toy). These behaviors were thought to reflect three main functions: 
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Mother entertains, which comprised engaging with contact and animating behaviors; Mother 
teaches, which involved pointing and demonstrating; and Mother directs attention, which 
incorporated showing and offering a toy, as well as verbal directives. We also computed a 
total score which incorporated the total number of maternal bids for joint attention. 
b) Infant’s response to maternal bids for joint attention. 
Immediately after the occurrence of any of the maternal behaviors presented above, 
the infant’s response received one of three possible codings: Achieves parallel attention (in 
accordance to Gaffan and colleagues, by following the mother’s action on the toy, but never 
alternating gaze between mother and toy); Follows joint attention (by following the mother’s 
line of gaze and action on the toy, and alternating gaze between mother and toy); Ignores (if 
the infant did not show any signs of being involved with the toy, attested by the fact that 
he/she did not look at the mother’s action). Parallel attention and following joint attention 
were subsequently scored as the proportion of instances of involvement in parallel attention 
and in joint attention (respectively), divided by the total number of maternal bids.  
c) Infant initiating joint attention. 
Initiating joint attention was defined as one of three behaviors. With the exception of 
non-communicative pointing, all required the infant to look at the mother while performing 
the following actions: animating a toy (moving the toy with the purpose of getting the 
mother’s attention); offering a toy (holding out a toy to the mother); pointing (extending the 
index finger in a conventional manner). Pointing could be of communicative nature (if the 
infant looked at the mother’s face at some point before, during or after the gesture) or non-
communicative nature (if the infant did not look at the mother’s face at any time). Infants 
received a frequency score for each type of behavior. However, due to the low frequency of 
initiating behaviors and in common with other research groups (e.g., Gaffan et al., 2010; 
Vaughan et al., 2003) we decided to collapse them into a single overall score.  
All the videotapes were independently coded by two trained judges. Mean Cohen’s 
kappa was .74 across all categories (Maternal bids for joint attention = .71; Parallel attention 
= .73; Following joint attention = .79; Initiating joint attention = .73). 
 
Emotional availability. 
The first 30 minutes of filming (20 minutes of free interaction and the following 10 
minutes of toy-play interaction) were coded using the Emotional Availability Scales – 3rd 
edition (Biringen, Robinson, & Emde, 1998). This coding system allows for the assessment of 
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emotional availability based on both maternal and infant behaviors. The maternal scales are: 
Sensitivity (9-point scale indicating maternal characteristics of warmth and emotional 
connectedness as well as appropriate and contingent responsiveness to infant’s signals); 
Structuring (5-point scale reflecting the mother’s ability to appropriately scaffold the infant’s 
play, taking into consideration his/her abilities); Non-intrusiveness (5-point scale that 
describes the mother’s ability to be available for the infant, without being intrusive or 
controlling); Non-hostility (5-point scale reflecting the absence of any implicit or explicit 
signs of hostility or impatience towards the infant). The infant scales are comprised of: Child 
Responsiveness (7-point scale indicating the infant’s willingness and pleasure in responding 
to the mother’s bids); and Child Involvement (7-point scale reflecting the infant’s ability to 
invite the mother into play, while maintaining a good balance between autonomous 
exploration and involvement of the mother). The summing of the scales for both infant and 
mother behaviors yielded a total emotional availability score. 
All interactions were scored independently by four trained judges. For reliability 
purposes, 48% of the videotapes were randomly selected and distributed to pairs of raters for 
double coding. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC, one-way random) were calculated for 
each of the mother and infant dimensions and revealed adequate interrater reliability 
(Sensitivity, ri = .88, Structuring, ri = .92; Non-intrusiveness, ri = .77, Non-hostility, ri = .86; 
Responsiveness, ri = .85, Involvement, ri = .80). 
 
Infant’s expression of negative emotionality. 
In the final 10-minute session the dyads were presented with a shape sorter and 
mothers were asked to teach their infants to place the shapes in the correct holes (Shape 
Sorter Task, Martins, 2007). Because this task was long and developmentally challenging, 
negative emotionality was expected to emerge. Infants’ behaviors (e.g., back arching) and 
vocalizations (e.g., fussing, crying) indexed their level of distress. Infants were classified into 
one of nine categories of negative emotionality (from 9 – No expression of negative 
emotionality, to 1 – Very frequent expression of negative emotionality). Infants coded from 1 
to 5 were later assigned the score of 0 – high expression of negative emotionality; whereas 
infants coded from 6 to 9 were assigned the score of 1 – low expression of negative 
emotionality.  
All interactions were independently scored by four trained judges. For reliability 
purposes, 67% of the videotapes were randomly selected and distributed to pairs of raters for 
double coding. Cohen’s kappa was .77 across the sampled interactions. 
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Infant temperament. 
During the home visit, mothers completed the Portuguese version of the Infant 
Characteristics Questionnaire (ICQ; Bates, Freeland & Lounsbury, 1979; Portuguese version, 
Pires, 1994, 1997; Martins, Martins, & Soares, 2006), which assesses maternal perceptions of 
the infant’s difficult temperament. This questionnaire is comprised of 24 items rated on a 7-
point Likert scale (from very easy – 1 to very difficult – 7) indicating the level of difficulty 
experienced regarding each of the behaviors. The Portuguese Version organizes the items into 
three subscales: Fussy-difficult (α = .84), Dull (α = .67), and Unpredictable (α = .60). Internal 
consistency of the instrument was α = .75. The total score expresses maternal perceptions of 
infant’s difficult temperament.  
 
Infant development. 
The infants’ mental and motor development was assessed approximately two weeks 
after the home visit using the Bayley Scales of Infant Development (BSID-II; Bayley, 1993). 
The BSID-II was administered in the child-care context by trained researchers, yielding 
mental (MDI) and psychomotor (PDI) development indices. The BSID-II has been shown to 
have good reliability (.83 for the mental scales and .77 for the motor scales). 
 
 
Results 
The descriptive statistics for maternal and infant attention related behaviors are 
presented in Table 1A.  
In what concerns the three dimensions of maternal bids for joint attention (Mother 
entertains, Mother directs attention, and Mother teaches), these resulted from summing the 
frequencies of the raw behaviors that comprised them. No proportions were calculated 
because the interactions lasted 10 minutes for all of the dyads in the sample. Fifty-one 
(98.1%) mothers showed at least one behavior pertaining to the dimensions Mother entertains 
and Mother directs attention. Thirty-seven (71.2%) mothers showed at least one behavior of 
the Mother teaches category. 
 Regarding infant attention variables, one (1.9%) showed no instances of parallel 
attention, thirteen (25%) infants showed no following behaviors, and 15 infants (28.8%) 
displayed no initiating behaviors. Seven infants from the sample (13.5%) showed no 
following or initiating joint attention behaviors. 
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Table 1A 
Mother and Infant Attention Measures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary examination showed that only parallel attention presented a normal 
distribution and could therefore be used as a continuous variable in the analyses. Infants’ 
following and initiating joint attention were positively skewed, thus violating the assumption 
of normality. Therefore, both were transformed into dichotomous variables. Nevertheless, 
infants could still be distinguished in two groups: one group of babies displaying no initiating 
behaviors (scored 0), and another group of babies displaying at least one form of initiating 
joint attention (scored 1). The same principle was applied to following joint attention. Each 
infant was classified into one of two categories: 0 if s/he showed no attention following 
behaviors; 1 if the infant showed one or more such behaviors. 
 
Relations Between Parallel Attention, Following Joint Attention and Initiating Joint 
Attention 
Parallel attention was marginally correlated with infant following, rpb = .26, p = .064, 
and unrelated to infant initiating joint attention, rpb = .15, p = .277. Following and initiating 
joint attention were significantly associated either using the interval, rsp = .37, p = .007, or the 
dichotomous measures, χ2(1) = 5.28, p = .022. 
 
Relations Between Attention Indices and Control Variables 
We performed association tests between parallel attention, following joint attention 
and initiating joint attention behaviors and the subsequent control variables: infant sex, 
presence of older siblings, Bayley MDI and PDI, and maternal education. Parallel attention 
 Min-Max Mean (SD) Median 
Maternal bids for joint attention     
Mother entertains 0-172 47.98 32.74 46.00 
Mother teaches 0-38 6.40 8.28 4.00 
Mother directs attention 0-74 27.35 16.97 25.00 
Infant response to maternal bids for joint attention     
Parallel attention (proportion) 0-.96 .68 .19 .72 
Following joint attention (proportion) 0-.21 .05 .05 .05 
Infant initiating joint attention 0-14 2.65 2.97 2.00 
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was associated with infants’ Bayley MDI, r = .28, p =.046. Infant initiating behaviors were 
associated with having older siblings, χ2 (1) = 4.59, p = .032, and marginally associated with 
being a girl, χ2 (1) = 3.64, p = .056. No other significant associations emerged. 
 
Relations Between Attention Indices and Potential Explanatory Variables 
Table 2A presents the correlations involving the dependent variables (parallel 
attention, following, and initiating joint attention) and the potential explanatory variables.  
Parallel attention was significantly correlated with infants’ negative emotionality, rpb = 
.28, p = .049, low expression of negative emotionality was associated with higher parallel 
attention scores. In addition, this attention index was positively correlated with maternal 
entertaining strategies, r = .34, p = .015, as well as total maternal bids for joint attention, r = 
.30, p = .033, higher frequency of maternal entertaining behaviors as well as total maternal 
bids were associated with higher parallel attention. Emotional availability also emerged as a 
significant correlate, r = .30, p = .031, higher mother–infant emotional availability was 
associated with higher parallel attention. In turn, following joint attention was solely 
associated with total maternal bids for joint attention, rpb = .30, p = .029, as higher frequency 
of maternal behaviors intended to draw the infant’s attention was related to the occurrence of 
infant following. The presence of infant following behaviors was also marginally associated 
with two types of maternal bids for joint attention – Mother entertains, rpb = .25, p = .077, and 
Mother directs attention, rpb = .24, p = .091, but not Mother teaches, rpb = .01, p = .962.  
Initiating joint attention was negatively correlated with Mother teaches category, rpb = 
-.36, p = .008, as higher frequency of maternal teaching behaviors was associated with the 
absence of infant initiating joint attention. This attention index was also significantly 
associated with infant expression of negative emotionality, χ2 (1) = 6.16, p = .013. In the 
group showing no initiating behaviors, 53.3% displayed high negative emotionality versus 
18.9% of infants in the group that had initiated joint attention at least once in the interaction. 
In addition, initiating joint attention revealed a marginally significant association with infants’ 
sex, χ2 (1) = 3.64, p=.056. In the group of infants showing no such behaviors, 80% were boys, 
whereas in the in the group displaying initiating behaviors, that percentage rose to 51.4% of 
boys. 
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Table 2A 
Simple Correlations Between Infants’ Attention Indices and Potential Explanatory Variables 
Note. a χ2; brpb; c r 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Next, we performed hierarchical regression analyses in order to examine which 
variables were unique predictors of each of the attention indices. For the sake of parsimony 
and statistical power, only the associations that reached significance were included in further 
analyses, which meant that the marginal associations reported above were omitted from 
subsequent regressions. 
 
Regression Analyses 
Hierarchical regression models were performed based on theoretical principles as well 
as on the significant associations previously described. Variables entered at step 1 concerned 
the relevant control variables. At step 2 variables regarding infant characteristics were 
entered, followed by maternal behaviors as well as mother-infant relationship quality at step 
3. 
 
Parallel attention. 
Five variables had significant correlations with the DV – infants’ mental development 
index, infants’ expression of negative emotionality, mother-child emotional availability, 
maternal entertaining strategies, and total maternal bids for joint attention. However, the 
variable concerning total maternal bids was not incorporated in the regression models in order 
 Parallel 
attention 
Joint attention  
Following Initiating 
Infant variables    
Difficult temperament c-.14 b-.24 b-.16 
Negative emotionality (high/low) b.28* a2.53 a6.16* 
Maternal bids for joint attention    
Mother entertains c.34* b.25+ b-.18 
Mother teaches c-.03 b.01 b-.36** 
Mother directs attention c.07 b.24+ b.003 
Total maternal bids for joint attention c.30* b.30* b-.22 
Relationship quality    
Emotional availability c.30* b.14 b-.11 
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to prevent singularity. We opted to include only the specific maternal strategy (Mother 
entertains) rather than the more global score. Therefore, at step 1 we entered the scores for 
infants’ MDI, followed at step 2 by infants’ negative emotionality, and at step 3 by emotional 
availability and Mother entertains (Table 3A).  
 
Table 3A 
Regression Model for Infant Parallel Attention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05 
 
The regression model was significant at Step 1, F (1,50) = 4.21, p =.046, explaining 
8% of variance. Infant’s mental developmental index was a significant predictor of parallel 
attention – higher infant MDI was associated with higher occurrence of parallel attention (β = 
.28, t = 2.05, p =.046). Furthermore, the regression model was significant at Step 2 (F (2,50) = 
5.36, p=.008) and explained 18% of variance. Infants’ negative emotionality was a significant 
predictor of parallel attention – low expression of negative emotions was associated with 
higher occurrence of parallel attention, β = .32, t = 2.46, p = .017, above and beyond infants’ 
mental development. Finally, the model was significant at Step 3, F (4,50) = 5.56, p = .001, 
and explained 33% of variance. Maternal entertaining behaviors made a significant and 
unique contribution to the prediction of parallel attention - mothers who tried to engage the 
infant’s attention by animating a toy and playfully touching the baby with it had infants who 
engaged in more parallel attention, β = .30, t = 2.36, p =.022. In contrast, emotional 
availability was not a significant predictor of parallel attention, β = .17, t = 1.38, p = .175. 
 
Steps and variables R2 (Adjusted R2) β F change 
Step 1 (df 1,50) .08 (.06)  4.21* 
Bayley MDI   .28*  
Step 2 (df 2,50) .18 (.15)  6.07* 
Bayley MDI   .27*  
Negative emotionality    .32*  
Step 3 (df 4,50) .33 (.27)  4.89* 
Bayley MDI   .30*  
Negative emotionality   .26*  
EAS   .17  
Mother entertains   .30*  
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Following joint attention. 
Only one variable correlated significantly with infant following joint attention – total 
maternal bids for joint attention. In order to further understand its predictive value regarding 
infant’s following skills, a binary logistic regression was performed. As anticipated, the 
regression model was significant, χ2 (1) = 5.19, p = .023 (Nagelkerke R square = .14; 
percentage of correctly predicted cases = 76.9%). Higher frequency of maternal bids for joint 
attention was associated with higher probability of infants successfully following those bids, 
B =.02, Wald = 4.31, p = .038.  
 
Initiating joint attention. 
Three variables had significant correlations with the DV – presence of older siblings, 
infant expression of negative emotionality, and the category Mother teaches. The following 
analytical strategy was used: Step 1 – presence of older siblings; Step 2 – infant expression of 
negative emotionality; and Step 3 - Mother teaches (Table 4A).  
 
Table 4A  
Binary Logistic Regression Model for Infant Initiating Joint Attention 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Steps and variables χ2 B(SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper 
Step 1 (df 1) 4.73*     
Older siblings  1.40*(.67) 1.08 4.03 15.09 
Step 2 (df 2) 8.80**     
Older siblings  2.10*(.87) 1.48 8.14 44.67 
Negative emotionality  2.28**(.86) 1.81 9.81 53.26 
Step 3 (df 3) 4.51*     
Older siblings  2.11*(.90) 1.43 8.26 47.90 
Negative emotionality  2.12*(.90) 1.43 8.33 48.54 
Mother teaches  -.09+(.05) .84 .92 1.002 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 
The regression model was significant at Step 1, χ2 (1) = 4.73, p = .030 (Nagelkerke R 
square =.12; percentage of correctly predicted cases = 71.2%). Having older siblings was 
associated with higher probability of infant initiating joint attention, B = 1.40, Wald = 4.29, p 
= .038. Furthermore, the regression model was significant at Step 2, χ2 (2) = 8.80, p = .003 
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(Nagelkerke R square =.33; percentage of correctly predicted cases = 82.7%). Low negative 
emotionality was associated with higher probability of infants displaying attention directing 
behaviors, B = 2.28, Wald = 7.00, p = .008). Finally, the regression model was also significant 
at Step 3, χ2 (3) = 4.51, p = .034 (Nagelkerke R square =.42; percentage of correctly predicted 
cases = 84.6%). Mother teaches was a marginally significant predictor - fewer maternal 
teaching strategies were associated with higher probability of infant initiating joint attention, 
B = -.09, Wald = 3.66, p = .056. 
 
 
Discussion 
Previous studies have focused on the patterns of emergence and correlates of joint 
attention. However, very few included measures of parallel attention, an index of infant 
attention thought to precede joint attention (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Gaffan et al., 2010). 
Our results show a positive marginal association between parallel attention and following 
joint attention. This result is partially consistent with Bakeman and Adamson’s (1984) 
suggestion of parallel attention as an implicit social context that scaffolds the emergence of 
more sophisticated infant joint attention. We believe this may be the case because parallel 
attention and following joint attention (but not initiating) both imply that the infant attends to 
or follows the focus of attention presented by the social partner. Conversely, parallel attention 
did not correlate with infant initiating behaviors, suggesting that the former might be involved 
in the development of the response dimension of joint attention, but not in initiating 
behaviors. Furthermore, following and initiating joint attention were found to be 
intercorrelated either using continuous or dichotomous variables. This last result is 
particularly relevant for the discussion that has been going on in the literature on whether 
different measures of joint attention reflect common (e.g., Tomasello, 1995) versus multiple 
sources of variance (e.g., Mundy et al., 2000). The positive association between following and 
initiating joint attention in our study goes in line with the notion that both indices of joint 
attention can be considered, at least partially, expressions of a common ability to understand 
intentionality in others (Tomasello, 1995). Still, following and initiating joint attention cannot 
be seen as redundant, as in our study each displayed a specific set of predictors. 
With respect to predictors of the attention indices studied, we found a consistent 
association of every attention index to categories of maternal bids for joint attention. 
Furthermore, different maternal behaviors played specific roles in each index. This confirms 
and expands previous research (e.g. Gaffan et al., 2010; Vaughan et al., 2003), further 
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clarifying the impact of particular maternal behaviors on individual differences observed in 
infant parallel and joint attention.  
Parallel attention was significantly predicted by maternal entertaining behaviors, 
meaning that mothers’ playful interactions were the most successful in eliciting infants’ 
engagement with the toys. In what concerns infants’ following of maternal bids for joint 
attention, total maternal bids was the only significant predictor. Nevertheless, a specific 
tendency appeared to emerge. Although marginally, infants’ following correlated with two 
specific categories of maternal behaviors: mother entertains and mother directs attention (but 
not mother teaches). Thus, mothers who attempted to attract the infants’ attention by 
animating a toy or playfully touching the infant with it, and that showed, offered and verbally 
encouraged the infant to attend to the toy were more likely to have infants who would follow 
their bids for joint attention. However, the fact that infants’ following did not significantly 
correlate with any other infant, mother–infant relationship or social-demographic variables, 
coupled with the modest indicators of the regression model, suggest that much variance 
remains unexplained. It is conceivable that antecedent, rather than concurrent predictors might 
have had a stronger impact on this aspect of infant joint attention. Results by Gaffan et al. 
(2010) support such claim, as they found 9-month shared attention with the mother to be 
predicted by 6-month, but not 9-month measures. In opposition, initiating joint attention was 
predicted by less maternal teaching behaviors, but did not correlate with any other of the 
maternal categories. This result could suggest that different processes operate in this attention 
index, in contrast with parallel attention and following joint attention. In fact, directing other 
people’s attention is thought to possess a more volitional nature, reflecting the infant’s own 
motivation for intersubjectivity (Mundy & Newell, 2007). In addition, Trevarthen (1979) 
underscores the infants’ high sensitivity to social contingencies, becoming less active when 
the mother takes the lead in the interaction, and being more active if the mother intervenes 
less. We can conjecture that more teaching mothers suggest attentional shifts more often, 
therefore interfering with the infants’ initiatives.  
In contrast with our initial hypothesis, emotional availability did not make a unique 
and significant contribution to parallel or joint attention. These results are surprising as we 
expected mother–infant relationship quality to have an impact on infant’s ability and 
willingness to share attention and emotions. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that we found an 
association between emotional availability and parallel attention, but not any of the indices of 
joint attention. This could mean that such social experiences might only have an impact when 
the necessary individual capacities are sufficiently developed.  
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Another key finding of this study resides in the fact that infant expression of negative 
emotionality played an important role as a significant predictor of parallel attention as well as 
initiating joint attention, exceeding any possible influences of infant temperament. Previous 
studies had already found associations between infants and toddlers’ ability to engage in joint 
attention and subsequent emotion regulation strategies (Morales et al., 2005; Raver, 1996). 
Our study therefore expands these results by showing an association between concurrent 
expression of negative emotionality and parallel and joint attention. Although we cannot 
make strong claims regarding direction of causality, our results do seem to support the notion 
that negative emotionality may influence children’s attention abilities. In fact, relevant 
neurophysiological findings have shown emotional mechanisms to be involved in joint 
attention related skills such as gaze monitoring (Kawashima et al., 1999). From this 
perspective, high negative emotionality may disturb behavioral organization, thus hindering 
the infants’ ability to mobilize his/her joint attention skills. Because later developing initiating 
behaviors are thought to pose more attentional demands on the infant than early developing 
following joint attention (Mundy & Newell, 2007), it is conceivable that the expression of 
negative emotionality had a particularly significant impact in the infant’s nascent abilities to 
intentionally direct other’s direction of gaze towards a new focus. In contrast, we believe that 
the influence of negative emotionality may have operated differently for parallel attention. On 
the one hand, this is a relatively mature skill which is believed to emerge around three months 
earlier than joint attention. In addition, due to the demands of the task, compliance may be a 
dimension underlying parallel attention. Indeed, research has found links between infant 
compliance to mother, and infants’ mental development (Lieberman, Padan-Belkin, & Harel, 
1995) and expression of negative emotionality (Stifter, Spinrad, & Braungart-Rieker, 1999). 
Nevertheless, parallel attention is a relatively unexplored index of infant attention, so more 
studies are needed in order to further clarify its nature and core mechanisms.  
Contrary to previous research (Van Hecke et al., 2007; Vaughan et al., 2003) 
temperament did not significantly correlate with any of the infant attention measures. 
Nevertheless, there was a general tendency for negative associations across every index of 
infant parallel as well as joint attention, suggesting a link between less difficult temperament 
and better infant attention outcomes. 
Curiously, our results showed that the presence of older siblings might have made a 
significant contribution to infants’ initiating joint attention. The putative role of older siblings 
on social cognition is not unequivocal, as research supporting such an influence (Ruffman, 
Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998) coexist with studies showing that family size (rather 
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than number of older siblings per se) plays a role on another milestone of social cognition – 
theory of mind (Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996). 
However, to our knowledge, no studies have reported an association between presence of 
older siblings and infant joint attention. Similarly to what has been proposed for theory of 
mind, it is conceivable that older siblings provide infants with opportunities to learn and 
practice joint attention behaviors within their zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 
1978). It may equally be the case that observing older siblings sharing attention and 
experiences, and consequently receiving social reinforcement for it, further encourages infants 
to share their own attention with others. Indeed, a study by Corkum and Moore (1998) 
revealed an important role of social reinforcement to the acquisition of infant joint attention 
skills. Nevertheless, because we did not collect relevant information regarding family size 
(i.e., how many people shared the household with the infant), we cannot be sure that our 
results reflect sibling influence or the impact of belonging to a larger family. 
Our study offers a comprehensive approach to the understanding of the factors 
accounting for differences in infant parallel and joint attention at 10 months. We did so by 
including measures of maternal behavior, as well as relationship quality, infant characteristics, 
and social-demographic features. We were able to discern the impact of different categories of 
maternal bids for joint attention - entertaining, teaching and attention-directing behaviors - to 
parallel attention, as well as following and initiating joint attention. In addition, results 
highlight infants’ expression of negative emotionality and the presence of older siblings as 
important predictors of these attention indices in the first year of life.  
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Testing Joint Attention in Infancy and Mother-Child Mental State Talk in Shared Pretense 
as Predictors of Children’s Social Symbolic Play Abilities at Age 3 Years. 
 
Abstract 
Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate the roles of joint attention in infancy 
and mother-child mental state talk in a shared pretense interaction in the early preschool years 
as predictors of children’s social symbolic play at age 3.  Method: Forty-nine children were 
assessed at 10 months for infant joint attention in interaction with their mothers and again at 3 
years for their social symbolic play with an experimenter, as well as mothers’ and children’s 
mental state talk in a shared pretense task. Results: Social symbolic play was significantly 
predicted by children’s verbal abilities. In addition, their use of desire references in the shared 
pretense interaction with the mother also uniquely predicted variation in the social cognitive 
measure of symbolic play, even after the influences of children’s verbal ability and mothers’ 
own use of mental state talk had been accounted for. Infant joint attention (following or 
initiating) as well as maternal mental state talk did not significantly predict social symbolic 
play. Conclusion: These results highlight for the first time a link between children’s mental 
state talk and their performance on social symbolic play at age 3 years – a social cognitive 
ability thought to precede theory of mind. 
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The ability to engage in pretense is a major developmental acquisition in the second 
and third years of life and it is conceived as an important step towards a mature understanding 
of the mind (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Leslie, 1987; Rakoczy, 2008). Because children’s 
symbolic play involves the conscious and simultaneous representation of reality and its 
fantasy alternatives (Lillard, 1993) – for instance, a blue napkin can also be a swimming pool 
or a blanket – it exercises double representation (real world and fantasy) thus promoting 
children’s ability for metarepresentation - an important foundation for later theory of mind 
(Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 2001; Rakokzy, 2008).   
Furthermore, social symbolic play – that shared with a partner – is considered more 
sophisticated than solitary symbolic play (Dunn & Dale, 1984; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), 
as it involves two distinct levels of social cognition (Bretherton, 1989; Lillard, 1998). The 
first level occurs even before the symbolic activity takes place and consists in the negotiation 
and assignment of roles and behaviors between play partners, highlighting contrasting desires 
and wills. The second level takes place in the pretend play per se and allows children to 
consider different symbolic perspectives at once. In this social context, symbolic experiences 
are growth opportunities for children to become increasingly capable of articulating their own 
perspectives with the views of others, co-constructing a representational context (Leslie, 
1987; Meins & Russell, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Empirical studies supported such 
claims, by showing that children who get more frequently involved in social symbolic play 
(with peers and adults) perform better on theory of mind tasks. For instance, a cross-sectional 
study found preschooler’s involvement in pretend play with the parent to be correlated with 
their performance on a battery of false belief tasks (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000), while 
another found longitudinal associations between pretend play with siblings at 33 months and 
later theory of mind at 40 months (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995).  
Conversely, little attention has been addressed to how children come to acquire the 
ability to engage in pretense. As it is often the case in development, pretense most likely 
grows out of earlier social-cognitive skills. Interestingly, joint attention and social symbolic 
play seem to share a relevant similarity – the ability to manage the perspective of a social 
partner. Joint attention emerges in the last trimester of the first year of life and regards the 
ability to coordinate (follow or initiate) visual attention with others to external objects or 
events (Tomasello, 1995). Because it is considered to reflect the emerging ability to view 
others as representational agents, whose attention focus may not coincide with one’s own and 
therefore needs to be monitored, joint attention is thought to be a precursor of later social-
cognitive skills (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Youngblade & 
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Dunn, 1995). It is then conceivable that children who display more joint attention behaviors in 
infancy would have more experiences in dealing with self and other’s intentionality 
(Tomasello, 1995), thus becoming more competent at integrating other people’s symbolic 
play suggestions. Indirect evidence of a link between joint attention and symbolic play comes 
from research in the field of autism. Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by 
distinctive social-cognitive impairments, namely striking deficits in joint attention and 
symbolic play (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Charman, 1997; Kasari, Freeman, & Paparella, 2006). On 
the other hand, studies with typically developing children have already uncovered 
longitudinal links between joint attention in infancy and theory of mind in the preschool 
years, as well as concurrent associations between joint attention and solitary symbolic play 
(Charman et al., 2000). However, no empirical study has yet addressed the possible 
longitudinal link between joint attention and social symbolic play in typically developing 
three-year-olds. A first goal of this study was therefore to investigate whether infant’s joint 
attention skills at 10 months significantly predicted children’s later social symbolic play 
abilities. We expected more joint attention in infancy to predict better social symbolic play 
abilities at 3 years of age. 
Apart from uncovering the putative developmental origins of social symbolic play, we 
were also interested in looking at its concurrent predictors. Considering the unquestionable 
importance of social experience to the development of the understanding of the mind (for a 
review, see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004), mental state talk was a relevant candidate. Such an 
influence may operate in two distinct ways: through mothers’ and/or children’s discourse. 
From a Vygotskian perspective (1978), mothers’ use of mind-related terms may be pivotal to 
the development of children’s social understanding. As they label their own and their 
children’s mental states, mothers may contribute to the child’s internalization of the notion of 
self and others as distinct mental agents (Symons, 2004). Recent literature provided evidence 
for this hypothesis by reporting concurrent and longitudinal associations between maternal 
mental state talk and children’s theory of mind (Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 
2002; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). For instance, in a study by Ruffman and colleagues 
(2002) maternal use of mental state terms was significantly correlated with children’s 
concurrent performance on a battery of theory of mind tasks, as well performance on these 
tasks one year later, even after controlling for children’s earlier theory of mind abilities. In 
addition, early theory of mind was unrelated to later maternal mental state talk, suggesting the 
link between maternal discourse about mental states and children’s theory of mind to be truly 
causal. Despite these evidences, it remains unclear whether similar associations will emerge 
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between maternal mental state talk and an earlier milestone of social cognition – social 
symbolic play. As a result, a second goal was to test whether the use of mental state talk by 
the mother would be a concurrent predictor of children’s social symbolic abilities. We 
expected that mothers’ use of mental state terms would predict more advanced social 
symbolic play. 
Children’s mental state talk can also be hypothesized as playing an important role for 
the development social symbolic play at age 3. In his theoretical account, Leslie (1987) posits 
an isomorphism between pretend play and the use of mental state terms, as both depend on 
the ability to form mental representations. Youngblade and Dunn (1995) take it a step further 
by suggesting that children’s mental state talk (regarding one’s own as well as other’s mental 
states) provides them with the necessary representations that facilitate social symbolic play. 
Indeed, empirical studies have shown children’s mental state talk to be related to later theory 
of mind abilities (e.g., Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Symons, 
Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005). Therefore, and given the links between social 
symbolic play and theory of mind (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Youngblade & Dunn, 
1995), it is conceivable that children’s mental state talk can also be a predictor of social 
symbolic play.  
To date, only two studies have attempted to address this issue. In their pioneer work, 
Hughes and Dunn (1997) reported a significant association between preschoolers’ pretend 
play and their use of mental state talk in a play session with a peer. Another study conducted 
by Nielsen and Dissanayake (2000) found preschooler’s use of mental state terms during free 
play with the parents to be concurrently associated with pretend play (as well as theory of 
mind). However, the former assessed both variables in a single play session, while the latter 
did not control for the children’s verbal ability or the parent’s own use of mental state terms, 
so their conclusions remained tentative. Our study aimed at expanding these previous reports 
by assessing pretend play and mental state talk in two separate tasks, while taking into 
account important control variables. 
This leads us to the reported links between verbal ability and both children’s symbolic 
play (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979; McCune-Nicolich, 1981) and 
mental state talk (Hughes & Dunn, 1997), and how language can contribute to the relation 
between these two dimensions. In addition, studies have reported that mothers’ and children’s 
mental state talk covary (Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2006). Therefore, one additional 
aim was to explore whether the expected associations between social symbolic play and 
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mental state talk were not solely explained by individual differences in general language 
ability and maternal mental state talk.  
In summary, this study had three major goals: 
1. To investigate whether infant’s joint attention skills at 10 months significantly 
predicted children’s later social symbolic play abilities. Based on evidence linking joint 
attention and theory of mind, as well as social symbolic play and theory of mind, we expected 
more joint attention in infancy to predict better social symbolic play abilities at age 3 years. 
2. To test whether the use of mental state talk by the mother would be a concurrent 
predictor of children’s social symbolic abilities. Following empirical findings showing 
positive associations between maternal mental state talk and children’s theory of mind 
performance, we expected that mothers’ use of mental state terms would predict more 
advanced social symbolic play. 
3. To explore whether the children’s use of mental state talk was a significant 
concurrent predictor of social symbolic play. Based on empirical findings linking children’s 
mental state talk and their theory of mind abilities, we expected more mental state terms to 
predict more sophisticated social symbolic play, even after controlling for the children’s 
verbal ability as well as the mothers’ own use of mental state talk.  
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 49 families recruited from child-care centers from a large city in the 
north of Portugal who were participating in a study on child development. The initial sample 
consisted of 52 families, however three families did not participate at the second stage of the 
study and were therefore excluded (one family refused, another could not be traced, and the 
third one was unable to participate at the time). This broader study also included the fathers, 
however only data pertaining to mothers and their children were reported here. Children (28 
boys, 57.1%) were assessed at two time points: 10 months and 3 years. At Time 1 (T1) 
infants’ joint attention skills were assessed and their mean age was 10.38 months (SD = .36). 
At Time 2 (T2) children’s social symbolic play, verbal ability, and mothers’ and children’s 
mental state talk were assessed. Children’s mean age was 37.78 months (SD = .99). At T2, 24 
children (49%) were singletons or had younger siblings and the remainder had one or two 
older siblings. Concerning maternal education, at T2 the majority (67.3%; n = 33) had higher 
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education qualifications, while 32.7% (n = 16) had completed between 5 and 12 years of 
formal education. All participants were White and had Portuguese as their first language. 
 
Procedure 
At T1, the dyads were visited in their homes and 40-minute home-based observations 
were conducted. In the first 20 minutes, mothers were asked to behave as naturally as possible 
so that she and her baby became comfortable with the presence of the researcher. Mothers 
were then asked to play with their infants as they would normally do with his/her favorite 
toys. This allowed for a 10-minute toy-play session to be video recorded. Following this 
period of play, an additional 10-minute play period was conducted, but the data obtained were 
not relevant for the scope of this paper. 
At T2 each child-mother dyad attended one session with the approximate duration of 
1½ hour, including a 15 minute break. During this visit, child-mother and child-experimenter 
interactions were video recorded and the assessment of children’s cognitive development 
(including verbal ability) was initiated. Within two weeks of the first visit, the children 
returned with their fathers, and similar procedures were conducted. In this second session, the 
assessment of children’s cognitive development was completed. Procedures took place in a 
university laboratory setting composed of two adjacent rooms separated by a floor-to-ceiling 
bidirectional mirror. 
 
Measures 
Joint attention behaviors at T1. 
The 10-minute toy-play interaction at 10 months was coded using an adaptation of the 
joint attention scheme designed by Martins (2003). This coding scheme was especially 
developed for the microanalytic assessment of joint attention indices in mother–infant play 
sessions. The original scales included both event- and duration-behavioral codes. However, 
because the videos were not originally made to assess joint attention, we were unable to 
reliably code the duration of the episodes as those rely on the microanalytic observation of the 
direction of infant’s and mother’s gaze. Therefore, only the frequency of joint attention 
behaviors was coded. The occurrence of efforts from the infant to direct the mother’s attention 
to a target (usually a toy) and the infant’s following of maternal bids for joint attention were 
the focus of the coding scheme and included the following behaviors:  
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a) Infant initiating joint attention. 
Three specific behaviors were considered, but apart from non-communicative 
pointing, all required the infant to look at the mother’s face at some point while performing 
the following actions: animating a toy (moving or rattling the toy with the purpose of getting 
the mother’s attention); offering a toy (holding out a toy to the mother); pointing (extending 
the index finger in a conventional manner). Pointing could be of communicative nature (if the 
infant looked at the mother’s face at some point before, during or after the gesture) or of non-
communicative nature (if the infant did not look at the mother’s face at any time). Infants 
received a frequency score for each type of behavior – animating, offering and both types of 
pointing. However, due to the low frequency of initiating behaviors we decided to collapse 
them into a single overall score. 
b) Infant following of maternal bids for joint attention. 
Immediately after the occurrence of any maternal behaviors intended to draw the 
infant’s attention towards an object (e.g., animating a toy; demonstrating how a toy worked; 
showing a toy), the infant’s response received one of two possible codings: Follows joint 
attention (not only by following the mother’s line of gaze and action on the toy, but also 
alternating gaze between mother and toy); Does not follow joint attention (the infant may or 
may not show signs of being involved with the toy, however, the infant never alternates gaze 
between the mother and the toy). Infant following of maternal bids for joint attention was 
scored as the proportion of instances of involvement in joint attention, divided by the total 
number of maternal bids. 
All the videotapes were independently coded by two trained judges. Mean Cohen’s 
kappa was .76 (Infant’s following of maternal bids for joint attention=.79; Infant’s initiating 
joint attention behaviors =.73). 
 
Children’s social symbolic play at T2. 
This structured play task was devised by Meins and Russell (1997) in order to assess 
the social symbolic abilities of preschoolers. This task called upon the child’s ability to 
incorporate the suggestions of an unfamiliar adult into their own symbolic actions. As a result, 
it was intended to mirror the extent to which the child was capable of attending to and of 
understanding other people’s perspectives in a play context. For this purpose, each child was 
presented with two sets of objects – two representational toys (doll and toy car) and nine 
objects with no obvious representational features, such as a toilet roll inner tube or a piece of 
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aluminum foil. A 5-minute introductory play session starting as soon as the child had made 
the first intentional contact with the objects served the purpose of familiarizing the child with 
the experimenter as well as the materials. The introductory session was immediately followed 
by the structured play session which involved two conditions – elicited and instructed play. 
At that moment, only two objects were left on the table (usually according to the child’s 
preferences): one representational toy and one “junk object” (Meins & Russell, 1997, p. 68). 
In the elicited condition no specific instructions were given to the child. The experimenter 
simply asked “What can you do with these?”. After the child had carried out some action or 
given a verbal response (or in the clear absence of either), the experimenter asked the child to 
perform a specific action (e.g., doll and water bottle lid – “Make the doll eat the dinner off her 
plate”) - instructed condition. The child was then randomly presented with each of the 
remaining pairs of objects. 
The coding for this task was based on Meins and Russell (1997) adaptation of the 
criteria by Lewis and Boucher (1988). Symbolic actions in the elicited and instructed 
conditions were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0 to 4) with higher scores corresponding 
to greater symbolic sophistication. In addition, the potential number of stages through which 
the child could advance to reach the maximum score in the elicited conditions was also 
recorded. These scores allowed for the calculation of an overall executive capacity score 
which reflected the child’s ability to understand and subsequently integrate the experimenter’s 
symbolic suggestions (Meins & Russell, 1997). In this study, we used this score as an 
indicator of children’s social cognitive abilities. The score was expressed by the following 
equation:   
 
 
 
According to the authors, the higher the score the more the child was able to benefit 
from the experimenter’s play suggestions by integrating them into his/her symbolic play. This 
ratio was intended to prevent floor effects, as it controlled for the number of levels above the 
child’s elicited play performance. Nevertheless, ceiling effects were also possible. In order to 
control for this possibility, we replicated the precaution measure taken by Belsky and 
colleagues (Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984) and correlated the executive capacity score 
with a score resulting from the absolute difference between instructed play and elicited play. 
The high positive correlation coefficient, r = .98, p = .000, ensured us that neither ceiling nor 
floor effects affected the executive capacity scores for this sample. 
Average score instructed play – Average score elicited play 
Average number of levels remaining above elicited play levels 
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Approximately 30% of the tapes were additionally scored by a second rater. Inter-rater 
agreement (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, two-way mixed) was considered to be excellent 
(Mean ri = .93; min = .92; max = .96).   
 
Mental state talk at T2. 
Mothers and children were invited to pretend to spend an afternoon at the beach – a 
common leisure activity for Portuguese families. A set of toys and props (e.g., toy food and 
drinks, empty sunscreen bottle, beach towels) were strategically placed along the floor of the 
room, and mothers were given a script with general guidelines. The task had no time limit, 
ending with a signal from the mother. This semi-structured shared pretense task was designed 
to elicit mental state talk from both mothers and children. All the interactions were videotaped 
and transcribed for subsequent coding.  
Following previous studies (Brown & Dunn, 1992; Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, 
& Ross, 2003) both children’s and mothers’ references to mental states were coded into one 
of the following mutually exclusive categories: a) Desires and interests: e.g., like/dislike; 
love/hate; want; prefer (e.g., “Where would you like to go next?”; “This is my favorite 
color!”); b) Feelings: e.g., bored; amused; excited; happy (e.g., We’re having so much fun!”; 
“Are you bored?”); and c) Cognitions: e.g., think; decide; know; recognize; remember; 
realize; expect; understand/solve (e.g., “Remember the last time we went to the beach?”; “Do 
you know what this is?”).  
Each participant received four scores for mental state talk: mental words in proportion 
to the total number of words uttered in the shared pretense interaction; desire references in 
proportion to the total number of mental state words; feeling references in proportion to the 
total number of mental state words; and cognition references t in proportion to the total 
number of mental state words. It could be argued that desire, feeling, and cognition references 
should be a proportion of the total number of words in the interaction. However, due to the 
high number of words in the sessions (M = 1217.02, SD = 403.62 for mothers; M = 295.67, 
SD = 167.78 for children), these proportions were extremely low. Nevertheless, analyses 
using those alternative indexes produced the same pattern of results as the ones reported here.  
A random set of 30% of the tapes was coded by a second trained researcher. Inter-rater 
agreement was excellent (k = .95 for both mothers’ and children’s use of mental state terms). 
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Cognitive development at T2. 
In the course of their two visits to the lab (the second visit took place within a 
maximum of two weeks following the first visit), children’s cognitive development was 
assessed using the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-
R; Wechsler, 2003). Although this scale yielded three scores: Performance IQ, Verbal IQ and 
Full Scale IQ – only the first two were used in this study. The WPPSI-R has been shown to 
have excellent reliability (.93 for the Performance subscale; .94 for the Verbal subscale and 
.97 for the Full Scale). 
 
Children’s temperament at T2. 
During the first lab visit, mothers completed the Portuguese version of the Childhood 
Personality Scale (CPS; Dibble & Cohen, 1974; Portuguese version, Pinto, 2006), which was 
intended to assess maternal perceptions of the general temperament characteristics of their 
preschool aged children. This questionnaire contained 48 items rated on a 7-point Likert scale 
(Never - 0 to Always – 6) and regarded the mothers’ perceptions of the level each statement 
described the child’s behavior in the preceding two months. The total score expressed 
maternal perceptions of the child’s easy temperament. Cronbach’s alphas for the Portuguese 
version of this scale ranged from .80 to .88, reflecting good internal consistency (Pinto, 2006).   
 
 
Results 
After presenting the descriptive measures for all relevant variables at T1 and T2 
(Table 1B), we begin by investigating the associations between children’s social symbolic 
play and control variables (Table 2B). Subsequently, we examine the relations between 
children’s social symbolic play and the potential explanatory variables at T1 and T2 (Table 
3B), as well as the links between mothers’ and children’s use of mental state talk (Table 4B). 
Finally, we test two regression models – one focused on joint attention behaviors as putative 
antecedent predictors of social symbolic play; and the other model including mothers’ and 
children’s mental state talk, as well as children’s verbal abilities, as concurrent predictors of 
social symbolic play (Table 5B). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for all relevant study variables are presented in Table 1B. 
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Table 1B  
Mean (SD) and Range Scores for all Variables 
 Mean (SD) Range 
Variables at T1   
Infant joint attention   
Initiating joint attention (raw) 2.65 (2.97) 0 - 14 
Following joint attention (percentage) 5.00 (5.00) 0 - 21 
Variables at T2   
Social symbolic play .05 (.04) -.07 - .11 
Children’s mental state talk (raw/percentage)   
Total 8.02 (7.47) 0 – 35 
Desires  7.00 (6.93)/ 80.12 (30.62) 0 – 35/ 0 – 100 
Feelings .02 (.14)/ .34 (2.38) 0 – 1/ 0 – 16.67 
Cognitions  1.00 (1.79)/ 11.38 (19.23) 0 – 7/ 0 – 66.67 
Mother’s mental state talk (raw/percentage)   
Total 27.59 (16.63) 4 - 81 
Desires 18.41 (12.85)/ 65.77 (21.96) 0 – 55/ 0 - 100 
Feelings .43 (1.17)/ 1.19 (2.82) 0 – 7/ 0 - 13 
Cognitions 8.76 (6.45)/ 33.04 (22.16) 0 – 24/ 0 - 100 
Cognitive Development at 36 months   
Verbal IQ 111.24 (16.55) 71 - 153 
Performance IQ 110.65 (13.17) 85 - 143 
 
Regarding the joint attention variables at 10 months, 35 infants (71.4%) displayed one 
or more behaviors intended to attract the mother’s attention to a toy or object. Concerning 
their responsiveness to maternal attention directing behaviors, 36 infants (73.5%) showed at 
least one instance of following maternal bids for joint attention. Based on these results, a new 
variable was created that sought to reflect the level of development of the infant’s joint 
attention skills. Those infants simultaneously displaying one or more instances of initiating as 
well as following behaviors received the score of 1 - more advanced joint attention (n = 29, 
59.2%). On the other hand, infants showing no instances of either initiating or following 
behaviors, or both, received a score of 0 - less advanced joint attention (n = 20, 40.8%). 
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Although significant variation among studies on infant joint attention renders comparisons 
difficult (e.g., infant-caregiver vs. infant-experimenter paradigms; structured vs. unstructured 
observations; naturalistic vs. laboratory settings) the descriptive statistics were in accordance 
with extant literature (e.g., Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998) by reporting the 
occurrence of joint attention behaviors at age 10 months, coupled with substantial inter-
individual variation. 
In what concerns social symbolic play, two of the nine pairs were excluded from the 
total score because of ceiling effects. The social symbolic play scores (computed from seven 
pairs) varied between -.07 and .11 (M = .05, SD = .04). The mean scores obtained were 
similar to those reported in previous studies (e.g., Meins & Russell, 1997; Meins, 
Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998).  
In the mother-child shared pretense task, 45 children (91.8%) used at least one mind-
related term regardless of type (desires, feelings, or cognitions). Forty-five children (91.8%) 
made at least one reference to desires, whereas 18 (36.7%) made at least one reference to 
cognitions. Considering that more than 50% of the children did not make any comments 
regarding cognitive states and that among those who did the mean number of such references 
was 2.72, we decided to dichotomize this variable. Thus, children received the score of 0 if 
they had not made one cognitive comment or 1 if they had made at least one comment 
pertaining to this category. In addition, because only one child (2%) made any references to 
feelings, we decided to exclude this category as it did not differentiate among the children. 
Comparing with similar studies (e.g., Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000) 
the mean values obtained for the frequency of mind-related terms were slightly higher. 
However, in the study by Hughes and Dunn (1997), the sample was composed of pairs of 
preschoolers while in Nielsen and Dissanayake’s study (2000) data were gathered in the 
context of child-parent free-play. In our study, children and their mothers were invited to 
engage in a semi-structured play task specifically designed to elicit pretense, possibly 
resulting in more mental state talk.  
In what concerns maternal mental state talk, all 49 mothers used one or more mind-
related terms regardless of type, whereas 47 mothers (95.9%) made at least one reference to 
desires, 46 (93.9%) made at least one reference to cognitions, and 10 made at least one 
reference to feelings (20.4%). Again, because over 50% of the mothers did not make any 
comments regarding feeling states (and the average number of references for those who did 
was 2.10) this variable was dichotomized. Thus, mothers were scored 0 if they had not made 
one feeling comment or 1 if they had made at least one comment pertaining to this category.   
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Finally, children’s age was not significantly correlated with any of the study variables 
and was therefore excluded from subsequent analyses. 
 
Relations Between Children’s Social Symbolic Play and Control Variables 
Table 2B presents the correlation matrix between children’s social symbolic play 
scores and children’s sex, presence of older siblings, and at T2, temperament, verbal IQ, 
performance IQ, and maternal education. 
As shown, the significant correlation between social symbolic play and children’s 
verbal ability was the only one to emerge, r = .37, p = .009. For this reason, all subsequent 
analyses were performed taking this variable into account.  
 
Table 2B  
Correlations Between Children’s Social Symbolic Play and Control Variables at 36 Months 
 
Social symbolic play 
Sex (M/F)a -.02 
Older siblings (N/Y)a -.17 
Easy temperamentb .14 
Verbal IQb .37** 
Performance IQb .16 
Maternal education (without/with college education)a .02 
** p < .01 
a
rpb; br 
 
Relations Between Children’s Social Symbolic Play and T1 and T2 Potential 
Explanatory Variables 
Table 3B presents the full and verbal IQ-partialled correlations between children’s 
social symbolic play scores and several relevant variables at both time points.  
No significant associations emerged between any of the joint attention measures at age 
10 months and later performance on the social symbolic play task. The lack of a significant 
association persisted even after controlling for children’s verbal IQ. Therefore, infants who 
had displayed more initiating or following joint attention behaviors with their mothers at 10 
months, or that had been classified as more developed in terms of joint attention, did not go 
on to being more able to integrate the symbolic suggestions of an experimenter at 3 years of 
Empirical Study 2: Predictors of Social Symbolic Play at 3 Years 
59 
 
age. On the other hand, children’s social symbolic play was correlated with the proportion of 
desire references made by the child, r = .33, p = .020, but not with any of the two remaining 
child mental state talk variables. The size of this effect was strengthened after we controlled 
for the influence of children’s verbal IQ, r (46) = .40, p = .006. Therefore, children who made 
more references to desire states in interaction with their mothers were more likely to better 
incorporate the experimenter’s suggestions into their symbolic play. No variable concerning 
maternal use of mind-related comments was associated with better performance on the social 
symbolic play task. 
 
Table 3B 
Full/Verbal IQ-Partialled Correlations Between Children’s Social Symbolic Play and T1 and 
T2 Potential Explanatory Variables 
 
Social symbolic play 
Infant variables (at 10 months)  
Initiating joint attention -.14/-.15 
Following joint attention .04/-.06 
Development of joint attentiona .03/-.02b 
Child variables (at 3 years)  
Mental state talk – total .19/.25+ 
Mental state talk – desires .33*/.40** 
Mental state talk – cognitionsa -.10/-.22b 
Maternal variables (at 3 years)  
Mental state talk – total -.18/-.18 
Mental state talk – desires .05/.14 
Mental state talk – feelingsa -.11/-.07b 
Mental state talk – cognitions -.04/-.14 
Note. All Pearson correlation coefficients unless otherwise specified. 
aDichotomous variables (No – 0; Yes – 1); brpb 
+
 p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
60 
 
Relations Between Mothers’ and Children’s Use of Mental State Talk 
As shown in Table 4B, mothers’ and children’s use of mind related terms were 
positively associated. Mothers who made more references to mental states were more likely to 
have children who employed mental state terms in their speech, regardless of type, r = .28, p 
= .048. This correlation remained marginally significant after controlling for the children’s 
verbal IQ, r (46) = .28, p = .051. In particular, maternal references to desires and cognitions 
were both associated with children’s references to desires, although in opposite directions. 
More maternal references to desires were associated with more child references to desires, r = 
.36, p = .010. In contrast, more maternal references to cognitions were associated with less 
child references to desires, r = -.36, p = .011. Finally, mother’s total proportion of mind-
related comments was associated with more child references to cognitions, r = .34, p = .016. 
The reported associations held even after partialling out the effects of verbal IQ. Because of 
these associations, we controlled for mothers’ use of mental state talk in subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 4B 
Full/Verbal IQ-Partialled Correlations Between Children’s Mental State Talk and Mother’s 
Mental State Talk 
 
Children’s mental state talk 
 
Total Desires  Cognitionsa  
Mother’s mental state talk    
Total .28*/28+ -.14/-.15 .34*/ .36* 
Desires .25/.23 .36**/.35* -.27+/-.23 
Feelingsa -.03/.04 -.07 .95b 
Cognitions -.23/-.21 -.36*/-.35* .26+/.22 
Note. All Pearson correlation coefficients unless otherwise specified. 
aDichotomous variables (No – 0; Yes – 1); bχ2 
+
 p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Regression Analyses 
We performed two hierarchical regression analyses (Models A and B) in order to 
examine which variables were significant predictors of children’s ability to incorporate the 
experimenter’s symbolic play suggestions at T2. Our choice of predictors was both based on 
theoretical principles as well as the significant associations previously described.  
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In Model A, we sought to uncover whether joint attention behaviors in infancy 
significantly predicted social symbolic play. In addition, because children’s verbal IQ was 
significantly related with their social symbolic play, we also included this variable in the 
model. Consequently, at step 1 we entered children’s verbal IQ scores and at step 2 we 
entered attention following and initiating behaviors in infancy (Table 5B).  
The regression model was significant at step 1, F (1,47) = 7.47, p =.009, explaining 
14% of variance. Verbal IQ was a significant predictor of children’s social symbolic play – 
children with higher verbal IQ scores tended to be more willing and able to incorporate the 
experimenter’s symbolic play suggestions, β = .37, t = 2.73, p =.009. In contrast, the 
regression model was only marginally significant at step 2, F (3,45) = 2.64, p =.061, 
explaining 15% of variance. Initiating, β = -.11, t = -.77, p = .446 or following joint attention 
behaviors, β = -.02, t = -.12, p = .906, did not significantly predict children’s social symbolic 
play abilities.  
In Model B we investigated whether mothers’ and children’s mental state talk 
concurrently predicted children’s social symbolic play at T2. Two variables significantly 
correlated with the social symbolic play scores – children’s verbal IQ and children’s 
references to desires in a pretense interaction with the mother – and were thus included in the 
regression model. We also decided to take into account two maternal discourse variables that 
were both theoretically relevant and that had been shown to correlate with the children’s 
desire references – maternal references to desires, r = .36, p = .010, and to cognitions, r = -
.36, p = .011. Therefore we entered children’s verbal IQ scores as well as mother’s desire and 
cognition references at step 1. Children’s references to desires were entered at step 2 (Table 
5B).  
The regression model was significant at step 1, F (3,47) = 2.82, p =.050, explaining 
16% of variance. Verbal IQ was the only significant predictor of children’s social symbolic 
play – children with higher verbal IQ scores tended to be more willing and able to incorporate 
the experimenter’s symbolic play suggestions, β = .38, t = 2.63, p =.012. In contrast, mother’s 
desire references, β = -.03, t = -.16, p = .871, and cognition references, β = -.06, t = -.42, p = 
.679, did not significantly predict children’s social symbolic play abilities.  
Furthermore, the regression model was significant at step 2, F (4,47) = 4.16, p = .006, 
explaining 27% of variance. Children’s references to desires in a pretend play task with the 
mother made a significant and unique contribution to the prediction of their ability to integrate 
the experimenter’s play suggestions – more references to desires with the mother were 
associated with better social symbolic play with the experimenter, β = .39, t = 2.65, p = .011. 
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This association was independent of the children’s verbal IQ as well as the mother’s own 
desire and cognition comments in the pretense interaction. 
 
Table 5B 
Regression Models for Children’s Social Symbolic Play 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 
Discussion 
Several theoretical accounts emphasize the key role of joint attention and symbolic 
play towards the acquisition of a theory of mind, in both typical and atypical development 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1993; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Kasari et al., 2006; Leslie, 1987). 
Furthermore, joint attention and social symbolic play seem to share a defining feature - the 
ability to coordinate social perspectives. These accounts guided our first hypothesis that joint 
attention skills at the end of the first year of life would predict social symbolic play abilities at 
age 3. This study was the first to attempt to trace the longitudinal origins of social symbolic 
play back to joint attention in a sample of typically developing 3-year-olds. However, the 
 Steps and variables R2 (Adjusted R2) β F change 
Model A      
 Step 1 (df 3,47) .14 (.12)  7.47** 
 Verbal IQ    .37**  
 Step 2 (df 4,47) .27 (.21)  2.64+ 
 Verbal IQ    .38**  
 Infant initiating   -.02  
 Infant following   -.11  
Model B      
 Step 1 (df 3,47) .16 (.10)  2.82* 
 Verbal IQ    .38*  
 Maternal desires   .16  
 Maternal cognitions   .07  
 Step 2 (df 4,47) .27 (.21)  7.04* 
 Verbal IQ    .42**  
 Maternal desires   -.03  
 Maternal cognitions   -.06  
 Child desires   .39*  
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results did not support our first hypothesis, as no significant associations emerged between 
any of the joint attention measures in infancy and later performance on the social symbolic 
play task, even after accounting for children’s verbal development. Infants that had shown 
more initiating or following behaviors in free play interaction with their mothers, as well as 
infants that had been generally classified as more developed in terms of joint attention, were 
not in advantage in terms of later social symbolic play. There are a number of alternative 
explanations for these results. The most immediate one is that early joint attention skills at 10 
months – following and initiating - may not forecast later social symbolic play. Such 
interpretation is consistent with the suggestion put forward by some researchers (e.g., Brooks 
& Meltzoff, 2002; Van Hecke & Mundy, 2007) that only in the second year of life do these 
joint attention skills truly begin to reflect children’s awareness of other people’s mental states. 
Therefore, for the purpose of establishing a longitudinal link between joint attention and 
social symbolic play, 10 months might have been just too early. Alternatively, Harris (1989; 
1993) argued that only certain types of pretense are related to the ability to metarepresent. For 
instance, children with autism are able, if appropriately prompted, to engage in simple 
pretense acts like object substitution. However, they are not able to impute pretend mental 
states to objects or other people (e.g., doll is happy). The social symbolic play task used in 
this study did not include the latter condition, so Harris’ proposition remains untested. Yet 
another explanation regards possible differences in symbolic play dependent on the social 
partner. Youngblade and Dunn (1995) found important quantitative and qualitative 
differences in pretend play at 33 months with either mother or a sibling. As preschoolers’ 
pretend play may differ across relationships, we do not know whether any associations could 
have emerged had we studied social pretend play with the mother, a sibling, or a friend 
instead of an adult experimenter. With this in mind, in future studies it could be worthwhile to 
code acts of pretense occurring in a mother-child interaction. Methodological aspects may 
have also partly contributed to the lack of associations, namely the nature of longitudinal 
studies, as links between variables may only hold for limited periods of time, disappearing 
when new forces gain relevance in development (Ruffman et al., 2002). Indeed, the range of 
results obtained for the social symbolic play task was narrower than one would theoretically 
expect, suggesting that individual differences may not have been at their maximum at age 3.  
Our second prediction regarded the possible influence of maternal mental state talk on 
children’s concurrent social symbolic play abilities at age 3. Contrary to our expectations 
supported by previous research (Meins et al., 2003; Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, & Crowe, 2006; 
Symons et al., 2006) no measure of maternal mental state talk, either general (total proportion 
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of mental terms) or specific (references to desires, feelings or cognitions) was significantly 
associated with children’s concurrent willingness and ability to incorporate the experimenter’s 
play suggestions into their symbolic play. The regression analysis confirmed such results, as 
maternal references to desires and cognitions did not predict children’s social symbolic play. 
These results can be interpreted in various ways. Firstly, we can conjecture that maternal 
mental state talk may have exerted its role in the development of children’s social symbolic 
play at an earlier stage and that concurrent mental state talk may in turn influence later 
milestones of social cognition. Such an interpretation is plausible if we consider Meins’ 
results of a direct effect of mind-mindedness at 6 months on children’s theory of mind about 3 
½ years later (Meins et al., 2003). Another possible explanation for the apparent lack of 
significant associations may have stemmed from the level of elaboration that mothers invested 
in their mental state talk. Previous studies on the impact of maternal talk about feelings have 
shown that causal and elaborate explanations accompanying such mental terms, rather than 
their simple use, were linked to better emotion understanding (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 
1994; Garner, Jones, Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997). We cannot rule out a similar effect in our 
sample, as we did not assess the level of elaboration of maternal mental state terms. This 
aspect leads us to the argument that accuracy of mind related comments might have also 
played an important role. In their study on maternal mind-mindedness, Meins et al (2003) 
found that mother’s use of mind-related terms that appropriately commented on their infant’s 
mental states at age 6 months significantly predicted theory of mind in the preschool years. 
Although this approach could have been conducted in our study, we opted not to do so. 
Making appropriate comments regarding an infant’s supposed mental states at 6 months 
involves a great deal of interpretation from the mother. On the contrary, at age 3 children are 
generally verbally fluent and increasingly able to communicate desires, emotions and 
thoughts (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). Therefore, a measure of appropriateness based solely 
on children’s affirmative responses to maternal suggestions and comments might not be 
suitable, as it would likely reflect other aspects such as children’s easier temperament or 
maternal sensitivity. Finally, it is conceivable that mothers’ proclivity to use mental state 
terms is not a stable trait, but rather a dimension of maternal verbal behavior that can be 
influenced by individual, relational and contextual aspects of mothers’ own lives. 
Accordingly, studies have found aspects such as maternal psychopathology (e.g., Murray, 
Kempton, Woolgar, & Hooper, 1993; Wan et al., 2007) or perceived marital conflict (e.g., 
Pancsofar, Vernon-Feagans, Odom, & Roe, 2008; Pratt, Kerig, Cowan, & Cowan, 1992) to 
interfere with mothers’ verbalizations towards their children.  
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Another set of results that also deserves discussion concerns the associations between 
mothers’ and children’s references to mental states. When mothers used more mental state 
talk (regardless of type), their children were also more likely to use mental terms in general, 
as well as more cognition words in particular, even after controlling for children’s verbal 
ability. One of the strongest links emerged between mothers’ and children’s references to 
desires – the more desire words used by the mother, the more the child tended to employ 
desire references. Such results are consistent with previous data (Symons et al., 2006), as well 
as Ruffman and colleagues’ (2002) proposition that mothers match their use of mental state 
talk to the child’s developmental level. It may also be argued that by using mental state 
language that the child can readily understand, the mother is providing the “appropriate 
framework for mental activity within a conversation” (Symons et al., 2006, p. 687). In 
contrast, maternal references to cognitions were inversely related to children’s use of desire 
terms. A possible reason for these surprising results may be that in the course of the 
interactions, mothers often used the phrase “let’s pretend (…)” to prompt children to engage 
in the pretense interaction. It is possible that children needed more coaxing when they were 
more off-task and thus produced less talk about desires (the most common type of mental 
state talk in our sample).  
Regarding our final prediction, we found support for the hypothesis that children’s 
mental state talk plays an important role in their social symbolic play abilities. In our study, 
children’s proportional use of desire terms significantly predicted their social symbolic play 
abilities, above and beyond the influences of verbal ability as well as mother’s own mental 
state talk. These results bring further weight to the idea put forward by Ruffman et al. (2002) 
that children’s talk about desires may be a training ground for their social-cognitive 
development. According to Wellman (1990) desires and beliefs are essential for children’s 
understanding of the mind and how it guides behavior. As children in our sample are still too 
young to possess a mature knowledge about beliefs, their explanations of human behavior rely 
on their attributions of desires. In fact, empirical studies have confirmed that children develop 
their understanding of desires before they understand beliefs and that the former assist them in 
the development of a mature theory of mind (Ruffman et al., 2002; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Our results therefore expand such accounts, by showing a similar pattern of results between 
children’s desire talk and their concurrent performance on social symbolic play – a milestone 
of social cognition in the early preschool years. Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that 
the cross-sectional nature of the associations between social symbolic play and mental state 
talk does not allow us to make strong inferences of causality. However, research confirms that 
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this may be an appropriate interpretation of the data. Similar to our study, others have 
provided links between children’s mental state talk and both concurrent and longitudinal 
social cognitive outcomes (e.g., Dunn et al., 1991; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Nielsen & 
Dissanayake, 2000; Symons et al., 2005). Specifically, an influential study by Hughes and 
Dunn (1998) focusing on the impact of discourse among preschool aged children and their 
peers, found that mental state talk at 3 years of age predicted theory of mind a year later, but 
not the opposite. These results support the notion of a true causal link between children’s 
mental state talk and their social cognitive development. Talk about desires may therefore 
have promoted the understanding of subjective stances, an ability required for social symbolic 
play. Interestingly, we did not find similar associations for children’s references to feelings 
and cognitions. Regarding the former, associations between children’s talk about feelings in 
the context of disputes at 33 months and later false belief have been reported in previous 
literature (Dunn & Brown, 1994), suggesting that not only the social partner, but also the 
context in which the interaction takes place, may modulate the influence of certain types of 
mental state talk to social cognition. It is feasible that in the particular context of pretense, 
desires and cognitions might have assumed the leading role. In our study however, more than 
half of the children did not make any references to cognition states, and for that reason related 
individual differences in social play might not have emerged. This particular set of results 
highlights the need to consider different types of mental state talk, and not just mind-related 
references in general, when investigating the role of children’s talk about the mind on 
development. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that children’s verbal abilities were a predictor of their social 
symbolic play. Previous studies (e.g., Astington & Baird, 2005; Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, 
& Lidstone, 2006) had already documented an association between the children’s verbal 
abilities and theory of mind, but to our knowledge only Charman and colleagues (2000) found 
concurrent associations between (solitary) symbolic play and expressive language in a small 
sample of infants aged 20 months (N = 13). Our study expanded these results by reporting an 
association between verbal abilities and social symbolic play in a sample of 49 3-year-olds. 
Additionally, we found no associations between easier temperament and better social 
symbolic play abilities, which suggested that performance on this social-cognitive task was 
not merely a question of a more sociable or outgoing personality. 
The findings reported expand previous research by focusing on a less well-studied 
milestone of social cognition – social symbolic play. We have explored the associations (or 
the lack thereof) between joint attention, mothers’ and children’s mental state talk and 
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children’s social symbolic play abilities. Our results highlight, for the first time, a link 
between early preschool children’s references to desires in shared pretense with the mother 
and their social cognitive competence in a social symbolic play task with an adult 
experimenter. This result has particular implications for subsequent research as it suggests the 
need to consider the role of different types of mental state talk, namely children’s references 
to desires, feelings and cognitions, when studying the development of social cognition. 
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“Let’s go to the beach”: Mental State Talk in Mother-Child Shared Pretense and its 
Relation to Mothers' Mind-Mindedness and Children’s Social-Cognitive and Cognitive 
Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
Objective: The main aim of this study was to assess the relations between mothers’ 
and their three-year-olds’ mental state talk in a shared pretense play task, and children’s 
social-cognitive and cognitive outcomes. We also looked at concurrent links between 
mothers’ mental state talk and their off-line mind-mindedness. Method: Forty-nine mother-
child pairs were invited to come to a laboratory in order to participate in a pretense play task. 
Videos were subsequently transcribed and coded for mental state talk. In addition, mothers 
were asked to describe their children, so their mind-mindedness could be assessed. Children’s 
social symbolic play abilities as well as full scale IQ and verbal ability were assessed by an 
experimenter. Results: Maternal off-line mind-mindedness was unrelated to mothers’ use of 
mental state talk during the shared pretense task. Children’s references to desires, but not 
cognitions, were concurrently associated with those of mothers’, even after partialling out 
children’s verbal ability. Whereas children’s references to desires were significantly 
associated with their social symbolic play sophistication, full scale IQ was positively 
correlated with their references to cognitions. Conclusion: Our results contribute to further 
the understanding of mothers’ and children’s mental state talk and their impact on children’s 
cognitive and social cognitive development in the early preschool years. 
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In recent decades, much attention has been given to children’s social-cognitive 
development from infancy through the preschool years. Two lines of research stand out in this 
literature. On the one hand, researchers have been focusing on developmental milestones of 
children’s growing social-cognitive abilities, such as joint attention at the end of the first year 
of life (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998), social symbolic 
play at age 3 (Lillard, 1993; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998), and theory 
of mind around the fourth birthday (Hughes et al., 2005; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
On the other hand, empirical studies have focused on children’s mental state talk within the 
context of familial interactions (Beeghly, Bretherton, & Mervis, 1986; Brown & Dunn, 1991; 
Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). However, only in the past decade did those two lines of 
research become definitely intertwined (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Slaughter, Peterson, 
& Carpenter, 2008; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005), under the 
assumption that both are part of “a growing sophistication in children’s understanding of 
mind” (Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003, p. 905). The concept of mind-
mindedness was particularly successful in bridging these two research areas (Meins et al., 
2002). Mind-mindedness refers to the caregiver’s tendency to treat one’s infant as an 
individual with a mind expressed either by the proclivity to describe one’s child in terms of 
mental attributes (versus their behavioral tendencies or physical appearance - off-line mind-
mindedness), or by the use of appropriate mind-related comments in interaction with the 
infant (on-line mind-mindedness) (Meins et al., 2003). This maternal characteristic is 
therefore conceptualized as representing a particular type of maternal sensitivity, one that is 
related to the infant’s or child’s mental states. Previous research already demonstrated 
longitudinal links between earlier on-line mind-mindedness with one’s 6-month-old infant 
and later off-line mind-mindedness when children were aged 48 months (Meins et al., 2003) 
but not concurrent associations between both during preschool years. Thus, the first goal of 
this study was to assess whether mothers’ mentalistic descriptions of their 3-year-olds were 
related to their concurrent use of mental state talk when interacting with them during a shared 
pretense task. 
Mothers’ mental state talk has been investigated with relation to their children’s own 
mental state talk in the context of daily family life (Jenkins et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2002; 
Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). For instance, two-year-olds’ mental state talk mirrors that 
of their mothers’ in terms of desires and cognitions in play situations (Symons et al., 2006). 
Likewise, associations between mothers’ and their 2 to 4-year-olds’ mental state talk during 
descriptions of pictures have been reported (Ruffman et al., 2002). These findings are quite 
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impressive as children’s use of terms for desires, feelings, and cognitions emerges in the 
second year of life, thriving rapidly during the third year (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; 
Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981). However, links between mothers’ and 
children’s mental state talk during shared pretense play have not yet been investigated, even 
though research has shown that: a) individual differences in children’s mental state talk are 
significantly correlated to pretend play among preschool friends; and b) mental state talk is 
significantly more frequent within pretend play rather than in non-pretend play (Hughes & 
Dunn, 1997). Given that pretense provides children with opportunities to “(…) (1) manage 
multiple roles as playwrights and actors, (2) invent novel plots, and (3) deliberately blur the 
boundary between reality and pretense.” (Bretherton, 1989, p. 383), looking at the 
interrelations between mothers’ and children’s mental state talk in this particular context 
seems relevant. Moreover, preschoolers’ ability to engage in pretense is linked to the 
development and elaboration of mental state terms (Leslie, 1987). Therefore, the second goal 
of this study was to investigate associations between mothers’ and their three-year-olds’ use 
of mental state terms while interacting in a semi-structured shared pretense play task. 
Both mothers’ and children’s mental state talk have also been linked to children’s 
social-cognitive outcomes in both experimental and observation studies (de Rosnay & 
Hughes, 2006). For instance, Meins and colleagues (2002) found that individual differences in 
appropriate maternal mental state talk assessed during dyadic free play interactions at 6 
months of infants’ life predicted children’s subsequent performance on theory of mind tasks 
at 45 and 48 months (Meins et al., 2002). In the same line, Ruffman’s team (2002) found that 
mothers’ earlier use of mental state utterances during descriptions of pictures was correlated 
with later success in theory of mind. On the other hand, children’s mental state discourse 
during story-telling tasks has been found to be concurrently associated with theory of mind 
performance (Symons et al., 2005). Similarly, children’s internal-state language in 
conversations with friends has been found to be related to later and concurrent theory of mind 
performance (Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Whereas there is a wealth of empirical findings relating 
mental state talk and concurrent or later theory of mind performance, the same does not apply 
to the relation between the former and social symbolic play, an ability thought to be a 
precursor of theory of mind (Leslie, 1987). Social symbolic play regards the child’s ability to 
coordinate their symbolic perspective in play (e.g. “this banana is a telephone”) with that of a 
social partner (e.g., “this banana is a sword”), therefore involving the capability to attend to 
and understand the representational viewpoint of others. In addition, because it highlights the 
dissociation between mental world and reality, social symbolic play has been considered an 
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important milestone of social cognition in the preschool years (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; 
Leslie, 1987; Rakoczy, 2008). The third goal of this research paper was to investigate whether 
mothers’ and/or children’s mental state talk were related to children’s performance on a social 
symbolic play task assessed with an experimenter. 
Finally, a fourth and final goal of our investigation was to assess if children’s 
emotional mental state talk (i.e., desires and feelings) was uniquely associated with their 
social-cognitive development, and in turn whether their cognitive mental state talk (i.e., 
cognitions) was uniquely associated with their cognitive development. This goal derived from 
a recent suggestion that to date, research has not looked at whether specific types of mental 
state talk are related to specific outcomes (de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). 
A closing note regarding the relation between children’s language and their 
understanding of mind. Research has consistently found a close link between language 
abilities and theory of mind, independent of age (Astington & Baird, 2005; Milligan, 
Astington, & Dack, 2007). However, the nature of this complex relationship is very much in 
debate (Astington & Baird, 2005). As it was not our goal to tap into this specific territory, in 
the case of children’s social-cognitive outcome, we opted to present full as well as verbal IQ-
partialled correlations. 
In summary, this study had four major goals: 
1. To assess whether mothers’ offline mind-mindedness was related to their concurrent 
use of mental state talk when interacting with their three-year-olds during a shared pretense 
play task. Based on previous results longitudinally linking those two dimensions, it was 
expected that more mind-minded mothers would use more mental state talk while interacting 
with their three-year-old children. 
2. To investigate associations between mothers’ and children’s use of mental state 
terms during a pretense play interaction. Given that previous research has found associations 
between mothers’ and children’s mental state talk in a variety of situations as well as positive 
correlations between mental state talk among preschoolers in pretense contexts, positive 
associations were expected between mothers’ and children’s use of mental state terms in a 
shared pretense play task. 
3. To examine whether mothers’ and/or children’s mental state talk were related to 
children’s performance on a social symbolic play task assessed with an experimenter, either 
with or without controlling for verbal ability. Based on empirical findings showing positive 
associations between mental state talk and children’s theory of mind performance, mothers’ 
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and children’s mental state talk were expected to be associated with children’s social 
symbolic sophistication, even after accounting for children’s verbal ability.  
4. To explore if references to desires and feelings were related to social symbolic play 
sophistication and cognition references to cognitive development. Following de Rosnay and 
Hughes’ (2006) remark, it was hypothesized that more references to desires and feelings 
would be positively associated with better social-cognitive development. On the other hand, 
more references to cognitions would be positively associated to cognitive development. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine child-mother dyads were assessed when the children (28 boys, 57.1%) were 
aged between 36 and 40 months (M = 37.78, SD = .99). Most of the mothers had higher 
education qualifications, while the remainder 32.7% (n = 16) had completed 5 to 12 years of 
formal education. All dyads were participating in a larger longitudinal study on children’s 
social-cognitive development since the children were 10 months-old. The initial sample 
consisted of 52 intact families (infant and both parents) recruited from childcare centers from 
a large city in the North of Portugal. However, three of the families did not participate at the 
third year assessment for various reasons (one family refused, another could not be traced, 
and the third one was unable to participate at the time). All participants were White and had 
Portuguese as their first language. 
 
Procedure 
Each child-mother dyad attended one session with the approximate duration of 1½ 
hour, including a 15 minute break. During this visit, child-mother and child-experimenter 
interactions were video recorded and the assessment of children’s cognitive development 
(including verbal ability) was initiated. Within a maximum of two weeks of the first visit, 
children returned with their fathers, and the assessment of their cognitive development was 
completed. Procedures took place in a university laboratory setting composed of two adjacent 
rooms separated by a floor-to-ceiling bidirectional mirror. 
 
Measures 
Mothers’ mind-mindedness. 
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Maternal mind-mindedness was assessed using the “Describe your Child” semi-
structured interview (Meins et al., 1998), aimed at evaluating the mothers’ proclivity to 
describe their children in mentalistic terms. Mothers’ answers to the open-ended invitation: 
“Could you describe (child’s name) for me?” were audio taped and subsequently transcribed. 
Transcripts were then coded for mind-mindedness using an adaptation of the coding schemes 
devised by Elizabeth Meins and colleagues (Meins et al., 1998; Meins, Harris-Waller, & 
Lloyd, 2008), whereby each attribute mentioned was classified into one of the following 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories: a) Mental - any reference to the child’s mental 
life including mind, will and wishes, intellect, interests, imagination, and metacognition; b) 
Behavioral - any reference to behaviors, such as games or activities enjoyed by the child, as 
well as behavioral interactions with others; c) Physical - any physical attributes as well as 
references to the child’s age or position in the family; d) Self-referential – any comments that 
were self-focused, therefore indirectly describing the child through an effect on the mother; 
and e) General - any general comment about the child that did not fit the above categories. 
Mind-mindedness was reflected by the mental category. In order to control for different levels 
of verbosity among the mothers, the mental category was expressed as a proportion of the 
number of mental attributes divided by the total number of characteristics mentioned (mental, 
behavioral, physical, self-references, and general). 
All the interviews were independently coded by the principal investigator as well as a 
graduate student previously trained for this purpose. Inter-rater agreement was excellent (k = 
.94).  
 
Mothers’ and Children’s Mental State Talk. 
Mothers’ and children’s mental state talk were assessed during a semi-structured 
shared pretense interaction where mothers and children were asked to imagine to be spending 
an afternoon at the beach – a common leisure activity for Portuguese families. A set of toys 
and props (e.g. toy food and drinks, sunscreen, beach towels) were strategically placed along 
the floor, and mothers were given a script with general guidelines. The task had no time limit, 
ending with a signal from the mother. This semi-structured shared pretend play task was 
designed to elicit mental state talk from both mothers and children. All interactions were 
videotaped and later transcribed.  
Coding of mental state talk was based on previous studies (Brown & Dunn, 1991; 
Jenkins et al., 2003) and both children’s and mothers’ mental state terms were coded into one 
of the following mutually exclusive categories: a) Desires: e.g. like/dislike; love/hate; want; 
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prefer (e.g. “Where would you like to go next?”; “This is my favorite color!”); b) Feelings: 
e.g. bored; amused; excited; happy (e.g. We’re having so much fun!”; “Are you bored?”); and 
c) Cognitions: e.g. think; decide; know; recognize; remember; realize; expect; 
understand/solve (e.g. “Remember the last time we went to the beach?”; “Do you know what 
this is?”). Each participant received four scores for mental state talk: mental words in 
proportion to the total number of words uttered in the shared pretense interaction; desire 
references in proportion to the total number of mental state words; feeling references in 
proportion to the total number of mental state words; and cognition references in proportion 
to the total number of mental state words. It could be argued that desire, feeling, and 
cognition references should be a proportion of the total number of words in the interaction. 
However, due to the high number of words in the interactions (M = 1217.02, SD = 403.62 for 
mothers; M = 295.67, SD = 167.78 for children), these proportions were extremely low. 
Nevertheless, analyses using those alternative indexes produced the same pattern of results as 
the ones reported here.  
A set of randomly selected 30% of the tapes was independently coded by a second 
trained researcher. Inter-rater agreement was excellent (k = .95 for both mothers’ and 
children’s use of mental state terms).  
 
Social Symbolic Play. 
This structured play task aimed at accessing children’s social-cognitive development 
by assessing the extent to which the child was capable of attending to and of understanding 
other people’s perspectives in a symbolic play context (Meins & Russell, 1997). More 
specifically, it called upon the child’s ability to incorporate the suggestions of an unfamiliar 
adult into their own symbolic actions. For this purpose, each child was presented with two 
sets of objects – two representational toys (doll and toy car) and nine objects with no obvious 
representational features, such as a toilet roll inner tube or a piece of aluminum foil. A 5-
minute introductory play session starting as soon as the child had made the first intentional 
contact with the objects served the purpose of familiarizing the child with the experimenter as 
well as the materials. This was immediately followed by the structured play session which 
involved two conditions – elicited and instructed play. At that moment, only two objects were 
left on the table (usually according to the child’s preferences): one representational toy and 
one “junk object” (Meins & Russell, 1997, p. 68). In the elicited condition no specific 
instructions were given to the child. The experimenter simply asked “What can you do with 
these?”. After the child had carried out some action or given a verbal response (or in the clear 
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absence of either), the experimenter asked the child to perform a specific action (e.g. doll and 
water bottle lid – “Make the doll eat the dinner off her plate”) - instructed condition. The child 
was then randomly presented with each of the remaining pairs. 
Symbolic actions in the elicited and instructed conditions were rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale (from 0 to 4) with higher scores corresponding to greater symbolic sophistication. 
In addition, the potential number of stages through which the child could advance to reach the 
maximum score in the elicited conditions was also recorded. These scores allowed for the 
calculation of an overall executive capacity score which reflected the child’s ability to 
understand and subsequently integrate the experimenter’s symbolic suggestions (Meins & 
Russell, 1997). In this study, we used this score as an indicator of children’s social cognitive 
abilities. The score was expressed by the following equation:   
 
 
 
According to the authors, the higher the score the more the child was able to benefit 
from the experimenter’s play suggestions by integrating them into his/her symbolic play. This 
ratio was intended to prevent floor effects, as it controlled for the number of levels above the 
child’s elicited play performance. Nevertheless, ceiling effects were also possible. In order to 
control for this possibility, we replicated the precaution measure taken by Belsky and 
colleagues (Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984) and correlated the executive capacity score 
with a score resulting from the absolute difference between instructed play and elicited play. 
The high positive correlation coefficient, r = .98, p = .000, ensured us that neither ceiling nor 
floor effects affected the executive capacity scores for this sample.  
Approximately 30% of the tapes were independently scored by a second rater. Inter-
rater agreement (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, two-way mixed) was considered to be 
excellent (Mean ri = .93; min = .92; max = .96).   
  
Verbal Ability and Cognitive Development. 
Children’s Verbal IQ and Full Scale IQ were assessed using the Wechsler Preschool 
and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler, 2003), which was 
administered by a trained researcher. Although the WPPSI-R yields three scores - 
Performance IQ, Verbal IQ, and Full Scale IQ – only the last two were used in this study. The 
Full Scale IQ was considered an index of children’s cognitive development, whereas Verbal 
IQ was used as an index of children’s verbal abilities. The WPPSI-R has been shown to have 
Average score instructed play – Average score elicited play 
Average number of levels remaining above elicited play levels 
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excellent reliability (.93 for the Performance subscale; .94 for the Verbal subscale and .97 for 
the Full Scale). 
 
 
Results 
We begin by presenting the descriptive measures for mothers’ and children’s speech 
variables as well as children’s social symbolic play and full scale IQ (Table 1C).  
 
Table 1C 
Descriptive Statistics for Mind-Mindedness, Mental State Talk, and Children’s Outcomes 
 M (SD) Median Range Yes (1+) 
Mothers’ Mind-Mindedness 
Total number of words 
Total number of attributes 
Mental terms 
Behavioral terms 
Physical terms 
Self-references 
General terms 
Number of categories used 
223.55 (186.69) 
21.08 (13.89) 
6.59 (4.73) 
11.24 (8.89) 
.49 (1.04) 
.88 (1.13) 
1.88 (1.98) 
3.57 (.89) 
193 
18 
5 
9 
0 
1 
1 
4 
51-1027 
8-73 
0-22 
2-49 
0-5 
0-5 
0-11 
2-5 
--- 
49 (100%) 
48 (98.0%) 
49 (100%) 
14 (28.6%) 
26 (53.1%) 
37 (75.5%) 
49 (100%) 
Mothers’ Mental State Talk     
Total number of words 
Total number of mental words 
Desires 
Feelings 
Cognitions 
1217.02 (403.62) 
27.59 (16.63) 
18.41 (12.85) 
.43 (1.17) 
8.76 (6.45) 
1195 
23 
14 
0 
7 
375-2760 
4-81 
0-55 
0-7 
0-24 
--- 
49 (100%) 
47 (95.9%) 
10 (20.4%) 
46 (93.9%) 
Children’s Mental State Talk      
Total number of words 
Total number of mental words 
Desires 
Feelings 
Cognitions 
295.67 (167.78) 
8.02 (7.47) 
7.00 (6.93) 
.02 (.14) 
1.00 (1.79) 
297 
6 
5 
0 
0 
1-826 
0-35 
0-35 
0-1 
0-7 
--- 
45 (91.8%) 
45 (91.8%) 
1 (2.0%) 
18 (36.7%) 
Children’s Outcomes     
Social Symbolic Play .05 (.04) .06 -.07 - .11 --- 
Full scale IQ 112.82 (16.87) 113 78-158 --- 
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We then tested the association between maternal mind-mindedness during the 
“Describe your Child Interview” and her use of mental-state talk while in interaction with her 
child in a shared pretense task (Table 2C). Next, we proceeded to the associations between 
maternal mental state talk and their children’s mental state talk and outcomes (Table 3C). 
Finally, we report the associations between children’s mental state talk and 
developmental outcomes (Table 4C). The last two steps were done both without controlling 
for children’s verbal ability, and controlling for it. All significant levels reported are two-
tailed. Table 1C presents the descriptive measures for mothers’ and children’s speech 
variables, as well as children’s outcomes. 
Mothers used more frequently behavioral terms, followed by mental and general 
attributes in their children’s descriptions. The use of physical attributes as well as self-
references were quite low. Given the medians for these last two categories, and the fact that 
less than half the sample used them, it was decided to dichotomize those two variables. 
With respect to mental state talk, desires were the most common terms used by both 
mothers and children. Children did not make much use of feeling or cognition terms during 
the shared pretend play task with their mothers.  
No associations were found between any of the maternal variables and mothers’ 
educational level, so this variable was discarded from further analyses. 
In what concerns social symbolic play, two of the nine pairs were excluded from the 
total score because of ceiling effects. Therefore, the reported descriptive statistics concern the 
total score computed from the seven remaining pairs. 
 
Table 2C 
Mothers’ Mind-Mindedness and Mental State Talk While Interacting with Their Children 
 Mental State Talk 
 Mental words Desires Feelingsa, b Cognitions 
Mind-mindedness 
Mental 
Behavioral 
Physicala, b 
Self-Referencesa, b 
General 
 
-.09 
.10 
.15 
.04 
-.11 
 
.02 
.07 
-.19 
-.05 
-.10 
 
-.02 
.16 
.45c 
.05c 
-.21b 
 
-.02 
-.08 
.19 
.04 
.12 
Note. All Pearson correlation coefficients unless otherwise specified. 
a Dichotomous variables (No – 0; Yes – 1); b
 
Point-biserial correlation coefficient; c χ2 
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Table 2C presents the intercorrelations between mothers’ mind-mindedness and their 
mental state talk while in a shared pretend play task with their children. 
Maternal mind-minded attributes about their children were unrelated with their use of 
mental state talk during shared pretense with their three-year-olds. Therefore, we decided to 
investigate any possible associations between mothers’ mind-mindedness and mental state 
talk and their children’s mental state talk and outcomes. Two sets of associations were carried 
out: correlations without controlling for children’s verbal ability and partial correlations 
accounting for such variable (Table 3C). 
 
Table 3C 
Full/Verbal IQ-Partialled Correlations Between Mothers’ Mind-Mindedness and Mental 
State Talk and Children’s Mental State Talk and Outcomes 
 Children’s Mental State Talk  Children’s Outcomes 
 Desires Cognitionsa, b  
Social 
Symbolic Play 
Full Scale 
IQ 
Verbal IQ 
Mind-mindedness 
Mental 
 
.16/.17 
 
-.07/-.10 
  
.13/.10 
 
.12 
 
.10 
Mental State Talk 
Desires 
Feelingsa, b 
Cognitions 
 
.36**/.35* 
-.08/-.08 
-.36*/-.35* 
 
-.27+/-.23 
.95c/.97d 
.26+/.22 
  
.05/.14 
-.11/-.07 
-.04/-.14 
 
-.15 
-.08 
.15 
 
-.22 
-.10 
.22 
Note. All Pearson correlation coefficients and partial correlations unless otherwise specified. 
a Dichotomous variables (No – 0; Yes – 1); b
 
Point-biserial correlation coefficient; c χ2; d B from 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression 
+
 p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Mothers’ use of mentalistic descriptions of their children, off-line mind-mindedness, 
was not related with children’s mental state talk or outcomes.  
With respect to mothers’ and children’ mental state talk, the more mothers used desire 
references during the shared pretense task, the more children did so too, r = .36, p = .010, 
even after controlling for their verbal ability, r (46) = .35, p = .014. There was also a 
marginally positive significant association between mothers’ and children’s reference to 
cognitions, rpb = .26, p = .068, which did not hold after controlling for verbal ability, r (46) = 
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.22, p = .14. Finally, more desire references on the children’s part were negatively related to 
mothers’ use of cognitive references during their pretense interaction, r = -.36, p = .011. 
Mothers’ mental state talk was not related with either children’s social symbolic play 
sophistication, their full scale IQ or verbal IQ. 
Finally, Table 4C presents the results concerning associations between children’s 
mental state talk and outcomes. 
 
Table 4C 
Full/Verbal IQ-Partialled Correlations Between Children’s Mental State Talk and Outcomes 
 Children’s Mental State Talk 
 Desires Cognitionsa 
Children’s Outcomes 
Social Symbolic Play 
Full Scale IQ 
Verbal IQ 
 
.33*/.40** 
-.13 
-.09 
 
-.10/-.22 
.30* 
.26+ 
+
 p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Children’s references to desires was significantly associated with their social symbolic 
play sophistication, both before, r = .33, p = .020, and after, r (46) = .40, p = .006, controlling 
for their verbal ability. 
Conversely, children’s full scale IQ was positively correlated with children’s 
references to cognitions, rpb = .30, p = .040. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study is premised on the assumption that mother-child discourse about desires, 
feelings, and thoughts is fundamental for children’s evolving mentalizing abilities during 
preschool years.  
Our first aim was to explore whether mothers’ mentalistic descriptions of their three-
year-olds were associated with their mental state talk while in interaction with them. No 
significant results were found, which challenged our first hypothesis. Two sets of results from 
Meins’ research team lead us to expect concurrent links between off-line mind-mindedness 
and interactional mental state talk. First, interactional appropriate maternal mind-minded 
comments at 6 months of infants’ age have been longitudinally (although not concurrently) 
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linked to later off-line mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 2003). Second, a high degree of 
consistency has been found between mind-mindedness in two non-interactional tasks, even if 
in a sample of school aged children (Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006). Why is 
it then that no concurrent associations were found between off-line mental comments about 
her child and her use of interactional mental state talk during a dyadic pretense task? A 
possible explanation is the fact that the nature of mothers’ speech observed in each task is 
different. When assessing off-line mind-mindedness, mothers were asked to describe their 
child to the researcher. In compliance to this request, mothers used indirect speech in a non-
interactional context, and could therefore reflectively select which attributes to use. In 
addition, we cannot disregard some effect of social desirability, as mothers’ tended to give the 
best descriptions of their children, which in the context of a psychological study could have 
resulted in more mental attributes that did not accurately reflect mother’s representations of 
their children, nor their daily speech when talking to their children. On the other hand, during 
the shared pretense task, mothers and their children were involved in an interaction, where 
direct speech was at play. It could be that mothers’ and children’s mental state talk influenced 
each other, leading mothers to adopt a type of discourse different from the one displayed 
while describing their offspring on their own. As we have not yet carried out sequential 
analyses (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997) on our interaction verbal data, this hypothesis remains 
unanswered. This explanation does not conflict with either empirical findings mentioned, as 
in the first study mothers’ appropriate mental state talk was very much one-sided as they were 
interacting with preverbal infants (Meins et al., 2003), and, in the second study, the 
consistency found was between two non-interactional tasks (Meins et al., 2006). Another 
possibility is that mothers who were more mind-minded when thinking and describing their 
children were also more sensitive to their children’s speech when interacting with them. In 
turn, that sensitivity could be expressed by following their children’s type of speech instead of 
taking the initiative of using mental state terms that the children were not spontaneously 
using. Future studies that include an independent measure of maternal sensitivity could test 
this hypothesis. 
Our study also aimed at exploring links between mothers’ and children’s mental state 
talk during shared pretense. Mental state terms start emerging in children’s speech from the 
second birthday onwards. However, not all types of terms emerge simultaneously. References 
to desires and feelings are the first mental state terms to surface in children’s vocabulary 
around the second year of life, increasing quickly in frequency thereafter (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton et al., 1981). Cognitions, on the other hand, are considered the 
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most advanced mental state terms, and tend to appear toward the middle of the third year, 
gradually increasing until the age of five (Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 
1983). Concurrently, children’s mentalizing capacities are rapidly evolving. At about two 
years of age, toddlers start displaying symbolic play, which will grow into more sophisticated 
capacities such as social symbolic play around the third birthday, and theory of mind about a 
year later (Astington & Barriault, 2001; Lillard, 1993). It is not surprising then that a 
privileged context for the emergence of mental state talk among preschool peers is pretense 
(Hughes & Dunn, 1997). Yet, no study has tried to establish whether mothers’ and children’s 
mental state talk is associated in this particular context. That was the second aim of this 
investigation. Initial descriptive analyses revealed that desire references were the most 
common terms used by both mothers and children. Conversely, children did not make much 
use of cognition terms during the shared pretense play task with their mothers, and only one 
child made reference to feeling terms. These descriptive results are interesting in themselves, 
as they seem to contradict the expected “natural” order described by earlier empirical studies. 
As to our specific hypothesis, our initial prediction was partially supported. On the one hand, 
mothers’ and children’s desire references during a pretend day at the beach were positively 
correlated, even after controlling for children’s verbal ability, which is in line with previous 
empirical findings (Symons et al., 2006) and a suggestion by Ruffman et al (2002) that 
mothers tend to match their use of mental state talk to the child’s developmental level. It may 
also be argued that by using mental state language that the child can readily understand, the 
mother is providing the “appropriate framework for mental activity within a conversation” 
(Symons et al., 2006, p. 687), which contributes to a Vygotskian approach to social-cognitive 
development. On the other hand, mothers’ and children’s cognition references were not 
related once children’s verbal ability was partialled out (being only marginally correlated 
before). This result contrasted with Symons and colleagues’ study who found that two-year-
olds’ cognitive state language was associated with that of mothers (Symons et al., 2006). We 
advance two possible explanations for this. Firstly, the fact that children made considerably 
less cognition references than anticipated (comparing to similar studies) may suggest an effect 
of the particular context of pretense. Although one might expect this context to promote the 
use of all types of mental state words, including cognitions, this speculation has not been 
tested to date. Therefore, future research could investigate whether the associations between 
mothers’ and children’s use of mental state talk may vary according to context. An alternative 
explanation for these unexpected results may regard the fact that often mothers made a 
specific reference to cognition “let’s pretend (…)” to prompt children to engage in the 
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pretense interaction. Therefore, the use of this mental state term might have been associated 
with attempts to initiate, or even control, the child’s actions, and not so much to mirror a 
cognitive state. This explanation is also consistent with the quite surprising result of maternal 
references to cognitions being inversely related to children’s use of desire terms. If some 
mothers’ used this cognitive reference to encourage children to engage in play, then it is 
possible that these children had been more off-task and thus produced less talk about desires 
(the most common type of mental state talk in our children). However, our conclusions about 
this particular result are rather tentative. 
A third goal was to assess whether mothers’ and/or children’s mental state talk were 
related to children’s concurrent performance on a social symbolic play task assessed with an 
experimenter. 
Contrary to our expectations, maternal off-line mind-mindedness and interactional 
mental state talk were not related to children’s social symbolic play abilities assessed by a 
researcher in an independent task. In what concerns the null results between non-interactional 
mind-mindedness and children’s social-cognitive outcomes, these are congruent with that 
previously reported on the absence of correlations between mothers’ mentalistic descriptions 
of their children and concurrent performance on a battery of theory of mind tasks at 48 
months of age (Meins et al., 2003). Meins et al. (2003) suggest that the reflective nature of 
this measure may not be a true barometer of the mother’s proclivity to engage with her child 
on a mental level. It could then be hypothesized that maternal references to mental states in 
interaction with the child would more likely be associated with the child’s enhanced social 
cognitive skills. Again, and contrary to our expectations based on earlier research linking 
maternal online mind-mindedness at age 6 months and theory of mind in the preschool years 
(Meins et al., 2003), interactional mental state talk was not correlated with children’s social 
symbolic play abilities. There are a number of alternative interpretations for this finding. First, 
it is possible that the use of mental state terms is not a stable maternal characteristic, being 
sensitive to changes related to other individual, relational and contextual aspects of the 
mothers’ own lives. For example, aspects like maternal psychopathology (e.g., Murray, 
Kempton, Woolgar, & Hooper, 1993; Wan et al., 2007) and perceived marital conflict (e.g., 
Pancsofar, Vernon-Feagans, Odom, & Roe, 2008; Pratt, Kerig, Cowan, & Cowan, 1992) were 
found to influence maternal verbal behavior towards their children. Second, we can 
hypothesize that maternal mental state talk may have an impact in later socio-cognitive 
milestones. Thus, it is possible that earlier (but not concurrent) mental state talk may explain 
individual differences in children’s social symbolic play. Such an interpretation is congruent 
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with Meins’ results of a direct effect of mind-mindedness at 6 months on children’s theory of 
mind about 3 ½ years later (Meins et al., 2003). Yet, another possible explanation for the 
apparent lack of significant associations between maternal mental state talk and children’s 
social symbolic abilities may have its roots on the level of maternal mental state talk 
elaboration. Previous investigations on the impact of maternal talk about feelings have shown 
that it is not their simple use that accounts for children’s emotional competence. Instead, 
individual differences on children’s emotional outcomes are better explained by mothers’ 
causal and elaborate explanations associated with their talk about feelings (Garner, Jones, 
Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997). With our data and results, we are not in a position to discard a 
similar effect in our sample, as we did not assess the level of elaboration of maternal mental 
state terms. This aspect leads us to a final argument on the potential role of the accuracy of 
the mind related comments. In their study on maternal mind-mindedness, Meins et al. (2003) 
found that mother’s use of mental terms that appropriately commented on their infant’s 
mental states at age 6 months significantly predicted preschoolers’ theory-of-mind abilities. 
Although this approach could have been adopted, we opted not to do so. Making appropriate 
comments regarding the infant’s supposed mental states at 6 months involves a great deal of 
interpretation from the mother. On the contrary, three-year-olds are generally verbally fluent 
and increasingly able to communicate desires, emotions and thoughts (Bretherton & Beeghly, 
1982). In addition, this was a pretend play situation, which, we argue, renders validity to all 
desires, emotions, and cognitions. Therefore, a measure of appropriateness based on 
children’s affirmative responses to maternal suggestions and comments might not be suitable.  
Finally, children’s references to desires, but not to cognitions, were related to the level 
of sophistication of their social symbolic play. This finding can be read in light of the ‘desire 
psychology’ theoretical position (Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). In early 
preschool years, children are able to understand and predict others’ behavior based on their 
desires (versus more advanced and later emerging ‘belief-desire psychology’). Based on this 
framework, the children in our sample are still considered to be too young to possess a mature 
knowledge about beliefs, so their explanations of human behavior must rely on their 
attributions of desires. In fact, empirical studies have confirmed that children develop their 
understanding of desires before they understand beliefs, which, in turn, will pave the ground 
for the emergence of a mature theory of mind in later preschool years (Ruffman et al., 2002; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). Although the cross-sectional and correlational nature of this study 
prevents us from making claims of causality between the mental state talk and social symbolic 
play abilities, research suggest that this could be an appropriate interpretation of the data. 
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Many empirical studies have found concurrent and longitudinal links between children’s 
mental state talk and social cognitive outcomes (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Hughes & 
Dunn, 1997; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Symons et al., 2005). Of particular relevance is 
the finding that mental state talk among three-year-olds and their peers predicted their theory 
of mind a year later. Convincingly, the opposite was not true, which lent support to a true 
causal link between children’s mental state talk and their social cognitive development 
(Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Talk about desires may therefore have promoted the understanding 
of subjective stances required for social symbolic play. 
Finally, we aimed at exploring whether specific children’ mental state terms would be 
differentially associated with distinct outcomes, namely social-cognitive and cognitive ones. 
In fact, our fourth prediction was confirmed in that whereas children’s references to 
desires were significantly associated with their social symbolic play sophistication, full scale 
IQ was positively correlated with their references to cognitions. This pattern of differential 
associations could add weight to the view of domain specificity, with emotion discourse 
(desire and feeling references) promoting social-cognitive development and non-emotional 
mental state talk (cognition references) facilitating cognitive development (de Rosnay & 
Hughes, 2006). Nevertheless, further research is needed in order to generalize the associations 
we obtained. 
We chose to focus on earlier social symbolic play abilities, in contrast with most 
literature which tends to be biased towards the study of theory of mind, for two distinct 
reasons. Firstly, pretense is a context where children tend to exhibit a level of social cognition 
that is above their performance in non-pretense contexts, functioning as a zone of proximal 
development (Vygotsky, 1987). We believe this, in itself, warrants pretense an important 
place in developmental research, from a social-cognitive point of view. In addition, this 
milestone is relatively unexplored in terms of its associations to mothers’ and children’s 
mental state talk. Our results contribute to further the understanding of mothers’ and 
children’s mental state talk and their impact on children’s cognitive and social cognitive 
development in the early preschool years. 
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Social Cognition in Infancy and Preschool Years: State of the Art and 
Unanswered Research Questions 
 
Social cognition is one of the areas of child development that has received most 
attention in the last decades. Yet, as in any lively research field, many questions remain 
unanswered, and new ones keep emerging. We sought to address some of those gaps in the 
literature by focusing on two important milestones of social cognition: joint attention in 
infancy and social symbolic play in the early preschool years. Regarding the former, we 
described parallel and joint attention in a normative sample of 10-month-olds, and made a 
contribution towards the clarification of individual, relational and contextual influences to 
individual differences in infants’ attention skills. In what concerns the latter, one major 
question regarded whether joint attention at 10 months was a predictor of social symbolic play 
at 3 years. In addition, were mothers’ and children’s mental state talk concurrent predictors of 
social symbolic play? This also led us to analyze individual differences in mothers’ as well as 
children’s mental state talk. Do these covary? Finally, we investigated the associations 
between mind-related speech and two important child outcomes: social-cognitive and 
cognitive development. 
In the next paragraphs we shall summarize our main empirical findings. 
 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
Paper 1 investigated the individual, relational and contextual predictors of infant 
parallel and joint attention (following and initiating behaviors) at 10 months. Results showed 
that parallel attention was marginally associated with infant’s ability to follow the mother’s 
bids for joint attention, but not to initiate joint attention him/herself. In addition, we found 
initiating and following joint attention behaviors to be significantly intercorrelated. Results 
suggested that these different dimensions of infant attention can be considered, albeit 
partially, expressions of a common underlying social cognitive ability (Tomasello, 1995). 
Yet, these indices are not redundant, as each presented a specific set of predictors. Concerning 
parallel attention, this attention index was significantly predicted by infant’s higher mental 
development, low negative emotionality, and more maternal entertaining behaviors. 
Following joint attention, on the other hand, was predicted only by total maternal bids for 
joint attention. However, a closer look indicated that his attention index was marginally 
correlated with maternal entertaining and attention-directing strategies, but not teaching 
behaviors. Nonetheless, much variation underlying infant’s ability to follow a social partner’s 
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bids for joint attention remains unexplained. We suggested that earlier influences might have 
played a stronger role than concurrent ones. Finally, infant’s ability to initiate joint attention 
was significantly predicted by the presence of older siblings, infant’s low negative 
emotionality, and less maternal teaching strategies (marginal). 
Paper 1 provided three important main findings. On the one hand, the consistent 
association of every attention index to categories of maternal bids for joint attention, and on 
the other hand, different maternal behaviors played specific roles in each index. The third 
finding regards the relevance of infant’s expression of negative emotionality for parallel 
attention and infant’s bids for joint attention. Although we proposed different processes for 
each attention index, still this study expanded previous research by showing an association 
between concurrent expression of negative emotionality and parallel and joint attention. 
 
In paper 2, we tested infant’s joint attention with the mother at 10 months and 
mother-child mental state talk in pretense at age 3 as predictors of children’s social symbolic 
play abilities with an experimenter. Contrary to expected, infant joint attention was not a 
significant predictor of children’s social symbolic play. Therefore, our study failed to 
demonstrate a longitudinal link between two supposed milestones of the development of 
social cognition in infancy and early preschool years. One question that can be raised is 
whether they are really part of the same developmental path. However, we argued that at 10 
months, joint attention could have been in its inception, and therefore longitudinal links with 
social symbolic play might have not yet been discernible (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005; Van 
Hecke & Mundy, 2007). On the other hand, because performance on social cognitive tasks is 
likely to be influenced by the social partner involved (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), we cannot 
rule out the possibility of uncovering longitudinal links between joint attention and social 
symbolic play had we assessed both with the same interlocutor (e.g., the mother). 
Furthermore, and contrary to our initial hypothesis, maternal use of mind-related words 
during a dyadic pretense interaction was unrelated to children’s social symbolic play. We 
posited different explanations for this result. Considering previous research highlighting the 
impact of maternal mental state talk, we hypothesized that, in our sample, maternal talk about 
mental states may have exerted its role in the development of children’s social symbolic play 
at an earlier stage and that concurrent mental state talk may in turn influence later milestones 
of social cognition. We also suggested that the level of elaboration (e.g., causal explanations) 
and the appropriateness of mental references – aspects that were not assessed in this study – 
might have been of importance. Finally, we raised the possibility that mothers’ tendency to 
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use mental state talk may not be a stable trait, but rather a dimension of maternal verbal 
behavior that can be influenced by individual, relational and contextual aspects of mothers’ 
own lives. Our final hypothesis was partially confirmed, as children’s references to desires 
(but not feelings or cognitions) were a significant concurrent predictor of their ability to 
incorporate the experimenter’s play suggestions into their symbolic play, over and above the 
influences of verbal ability as well as mother’s own mental state talk. These results 
corroborate the notion that children’s understanding of desires assists them in the 
development of social symbolic play, an earlier milestone of social cognition (Ruffman, 
Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
Overall, results in paper 2 underlined the need to consider different types of mental 
state talk, as well as mutual influences between children’s and mothers’ references to mental 
states, and not just the presence of such references in general, when investigating the 
development of social cognition in early preschool years. 
 
In Paper 3 we sought to further investigate such links, as well as to explore the impact 
of mother-child mental state talk to both children’s social cognitive and cognitive 
development. In addition, we aimed at assessing whether maternal off-line mind-mindedness 
was related to both her own and her child’s mental state talk. With respect to the former, we 
found that mothers’ mental state talk in shared pretense was not related to their concurrent 
mentalistic descriptions of their 3-year-olds. We conjectured that the nature of mothers’ 
speech observed in each task was different. Mental descriptions were collected in an 
interview, therefore mothers could be more reflective and selective about which attributes to 
use. Mental state talk on the other hand, was subject to less “filtering”, as well as to the 
influences of the child’s own speech and behavior. Furthermore, we hypothesized that this 
lack of association might be due to a higher attunement of mothers describing their children 
with mental attributes, as these mothers would be more able to adapt their speech to the 
child’s own use of mental state talk. Indeed, this paper provided some support to this 
hypothesis, as mothers’ and children’s references to desires were positively associated, even 
after taking into account children’s verbal ability. Considering that references to desires are 
among the first to spontaneously emerge in children’s vocabularies (Bretherton & Beeghly, 
1982; Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981), this result is in line with the suggestion 
put forward by Ruffman and colleagues (2002) that mothers tend to match their use of mental 
state talk to the child’s developmental level. On the other hand, maternal and children’s 
references to cognitions were only marginally associated, becoming non-significant once 
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children’s verbal abilities were partialled out. In addition, maternal references to cognitions 
were inversely related to children’s desire references. We hypothesized that mothers’ use of 
“pretend” (the most common reference to cognition) might have served the purpose of 
coaxing the child into play, rather than truly reflect a cognitive state. Finally, we found 
children’s mental state talk to significantly relate to two important developmental outcomes. 
Children’s references to desires were related to the level of sophistication of their social 
symbolic play, whereas their references to cognitions were associated with their full-scale IQ. 
This pattern of differential associations supports the view of domain specificity, where 
emotion discourse (desire and feeling references) could promote social-cognitive development 
and non-emotional mental state talk (cognition references) might play a role in facilitating 
cognitive development (de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). 
 
Limitations 
In conclusion, some limitations are worthy of mention. One is the limited aspects of 
joint attention measured, namely the fact that duration of episodes was not included – an 
aspect that could be of great importance, above and beyond the simples occurrence of joint 
attention behaviors. However, the videos were not originally made to assess this aspect of 
social cognition, so we were unable to reliably code the duration of parallel and joint attention 
episodes, only the frequency of attention behaviors. 
Second, our sample consisted mainly of White mothers of middle to upper-middle 
social economic status. If this can be an advantage from the viewpoint of having a sample 
virtually free of severe risk factors, allowing us to be as close as possible to a normative 
sample, on the other hand, there are obvious limits to the generalization of these results. In 
addition, although we have collected data regarding mothers’ recent life experiences and 
psychopathology, aspects which are known to affect maternal interactive behaviors, we did 
not have the opportunity to analyze those data yet. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
The findings reported in this study raise a number of interesting questions for further 
research. First, is joint attention in the second year of life, rather than at the end of the first 
year, a predictor of later social symbolic play? Second, we have only addressed the possibility 
that infant’s joint attention with the mother is a predictor of later social symbolic play with an 
experimenter. However, links may be relationship specific. It is important to conduct 
assessments of these milestones with the same partner (e.g., mother, experimenter, sibling or 
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peer) in order to further explore this possibility. A partner that is also of interest is the father. 
Which contributions do fathers bring to their children’s social-cognitive development? In 
what concerns symbolic play, future studies may address other relevant features, such as 
solitary symbolic play, attribution of pretend mental states, or role playing. 
Another challenge for future research is to investigate whether other qualitative 
characteristics of maternal speech, such as causal elaboration and appropriateness of maternal 
mental state talk, or how each maternal utterance is semantically related to the children’s 
previous utterance – a term coined connectedness (Ensor & Hughes, 2008) – can impact on 
children’s social understanding. 
Finally, this study has found differential links between children’s desire references and 
social symbolic play, and cognitive references and cognitive development. Further research is 
needed to replicate these results as well as to explore if they expand to other social cognitive 
or cognitive measures such as theory of mind or non-verbal measures of intelligence, 
respectively. 
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Metodologias de Avaliação do Desenvolvimento da Cognição Social da Infância até à Idade 
Pré-Escolar 
 
Resumo 
Nas últimas décadas, a Psicologia do Desenvolvimento tem vindo a delinear o 
percurso do desenvolvimento sócio-cognitivo na procura de respostas a uma questão essencial 
– Como evoluem as capacidades de mentalização das crianças? O interesse em conhecer as 
fases que marcam o desenvolvimento da cognição social, desde as idades mais precoces até à 
consolidação da compreensão das causas psicológicas dos comportamentos, é legitimado pela 
importância vital com que estas fases se revestem ao nível da compreensão e comportamento 
sociais. Neste sentido, os objectivos do presente trabalho são: (a) descrever os três marcos 
sócio-cognitivos comummente descritos na literatura desde a infância até à idade pré-escolar; 
e (b) apresentar exemplos de metodologias que permitam a sua avaliação em amostras com 
desenvolvimento típico e atípico. 
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Marcos do Desenvolvimento da Cognição Social 
Vários autores têm identificado marcos sócio-cognitivos desde a infância até ao final 
da idade pré-escolar, salientando-se, entre eles, a atenção partilhada no final do primeiro ano 
de vida (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Gaffan, 
Martins, Healy, & Murray, 2010); o jogo simbólico social emergente cerca dos 3 anos 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Rakoczy, 2008; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995); e a teoria da 
mente que se consolida entre os 4 e 5 anos de idade (Hughes et al., 2005; Wimmer, & Perner, 
1983; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
Num esforço construtivo de compreensão de como e quando começamos a entender os 
outros enquanto agentes intencionais, este campo de estudo tem registado sucessivas 
evoluções. Estudos pioneiros na área tiveram como principal foco de interesse a determinação 
das idades típicas de emergência destas competências (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Flavell, 
Flavell, & Green, 1987; Lillard, 1994; Ungerer, Zelazo, Kearsley, & O’Leary, 1981; Wellman 
et al., 2001). Ao longo dos últimos anos, no entanto, assiste-se a um entusiasmo crescente na 
procura de diferenças individuais ao nível das competências sócio-cognitivas, com a atenção 
científica a dedicar-se ao impacto de factores relacionais como a qualidade da relação mãe-
criança (Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998), a existência de irmãos (Dunn, 
Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998) e das relações 
entre pares (Cutting & Dunn, 2006), bem como ao estudo dos seus correlatos neuronais 
(German, Niehaus, Roarty, Giesbrecht, & Miller, 2004; Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006; Siegal 
& Varley, 2002). Por outro lado, tem-se gerado uma maior controvérsia em torno de variáveis 
como as funções executivas (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 
2001) e a linguagem (Astington & Jenkins, 1999), na medida em que a literatura não é ainda 
conclusiva no que se refere aos seus papéis enquanto correlatos ou preditores do 
desenvolvimento sócio-cognitivo. Numa outra linha, os investigadores têm vindo a debruçar-
se sobre a possibilidade de existirem associações longitudinais entre os marcos sócio-
cognitivos precoces, como a atenção partilhada e o jogo simbólico social, e a posterior 
aquisição da teoria da mente (Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops & Perucchini, 2008; Youngblade & 
Dunn, 1995).  
De seguida, apresentam-se de uma forma concisa as características de cada um destes 
marcos sócio-cognitivos. 
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Atenção partilhada. 
Desde muito cedo, os bebés evidenciam comportamentos pro-sociais que incluem a 
imitação de expressões faciais (Meltzoff & Moore, 2002) e a preferência por faces e estímulos 
humanos (Rochat & Striano, 1999). Na mesma linha, Trevarthen (1979) e colaboradores 
(Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978) descreveram um conjunto de 
comportamentos do bebé indiciadores de uma predisposição inata para a comunicação e para 
a sociabilidade. Mais ainda, por volta dos 9 meses de idade, os bebés entram numa nova fase 
do desenvolvimento da cognição social – a intersubjectividade secundária (Trevarthen & 
Hubley, 1978). Se até então as interacções se baseavam essencialmente em trocas face-a-face 
entre o bebé e a mãe (intersubjectividade primária) ou em interacções bebé-objecto, a partir 
deste momento, os bebés tornam-se progressivamente capazes de participar em interacções 
triádicas, nas quais a atenção em relação a um objecto é partilhada com uma segunda pessoa 
(Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Martins, 2003). Desta forma, os bebés são agora capazes de 
levar a cabo um conjunto de comportamentos com a finalidade de partilhar, seguir e 
direccionar o interesse face a objectos ou actividades com as pessoas com quem interagem 
(Bosa, 2002; Carpenter et al., 1998; Martins, 2003).  
Os investigadores são unânimes em enfatizar o aparecimento simultâneo de um 
conjunto de competências inter-relacionadas (cerca dos 9-12 meses), enquanto índices de 
intersubjectividade secundária, nomeadamente: (a) a partilha da atenção, que corresponde 
aos períodos de tempo em que mãe e bebé se centram num mesmo objecto e, 
simultaneamente, o bebé monitoriza a atenção da mãe, alternando o seu olhar entre a face 
desta e o objecto em causa, (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Carpenter et al., 1998); (b) a 
capacidade do bebé de seguir a atenção, presenciada quando este procura o foco de interesse 
da mãe, utilizando como pista a sua linha de visão ou o seu gesto de apontar (Corkum & 
Moore, 1995; Scaife & Bruner, 1975); e (c) o direccionar da atenção de outrem, verificada 
quando o bebé procura deliberadamente dirigir a atenção da mãe através de gestos como 
apontar, oferecer ou mostrar um brinquedo (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Carpenter et 
al., 1998). Os episódios descritos pelos vários investigadores citados possuem um importante 
denominador comum: a monitorização e a partilha da atenção do bebé com o outro em relação 
a um objecto exterior à díade – evidenciando, nas palavras de Carpenter e colaboradores, “the 
initial meeting of the minds” (1998, p. 2). 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
111 
 
Jogo simbólico social. 
O jogo simbólico tem sido amplamente estudado no seio da Psicologia do 
Desenvolvimento dados os seus importantes contributos para diferentes dimensões do 
desenvolvimento infantil, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à emergência da compreensão 
da mente. Na perspectiva de Vygotsky (1966), o jogo simbólico é considerado um exercício 
do pensamento representacional, através do qual a criança se torna capaz de separar os 
significados dos actos e dos objectos que os originam. O jogo de “faz-de-conta”, que surge 
por volta do segundo ano de vida (Bornstein, Haynes, O’Reilly, & Painter, 1996), envolve, 
assim, a representação consciente e simultânea da realidade e das suas alternativas de fantasia 
(ex. um guardanapo azul pode ser também uma “piscina” ou um “cobertor”). 
Relativamente à evolução da capacidade simbólica, McCune-Nicholich (1981) refere a 
existência de diferentes fases, sendo que, cerca dos 3 anos, as crianças atingem o nível mais 
elevado. Tal manifesta-se na sua capacidade de gerar actividade simbólica ao nível mental e 
de forma planeada, bem como de coordenar simultaneamente duas ou mais estruturas 
representacionais. Paralelamente, tem também lugar um alargamento significativo da rede 
social das crianças, aspecto que fomenta a complexificação em termos do pensamento 
simbólico, evidente na emergência do jogo simbólico social. Partindo da noção de zona de 
desenvolvimento proximal de Vygotsky (1978), a interacção com parceiros mais experientes e 
capazes promove uma maior competência e sofisticação da capacidade simbólica nas crianças 
(Dunn & Dale, 1984; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Por outro lado, o jogo simbólico social 
exercita dois níveis distintos do pensamento sócio-cognitivo (Lillard, 1998a). O primeiro 
nível, out-of-frame, ocorre antes mesmo da actividade simbólica, durante a negociação dos 
papéis e acções por parte da criança e dos seus companheiros de brincadeira, tornando 
salientes vontades e desejos contraditórios. O segundo nível, within-frame, ocorre durante o 
jogo propriamente dito, caracterizando-se, essencialmente, por um exercício de descentração 
que permite à criança considerar em simultâneo as várias perspectivas simbólicas. Neste 
contexto, as experiências de jogo simbólico social constituem-se como oportunidades de 
desenvolvimento, permitindo à criança tornar-se progressivamente capaz de articular as 
próprias perspectivas com as dos outros, co-construindo um contexto representacional (Leslie, 
1987; Lillard, 2002; Meins & Russell, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). 
 
Teoria da mente. 
Entre os 4 e os 5 anos de idade, assiste-se a uma evolução assinalável em termos 
sócio-cognitivos que é representada pela aquisição da teoria da mente. Esta recém-adquirida 
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competência possibilitará, pela primeira vez, a previsão e a explicação do comportamento e 
do pensamento dos outros, tendo como referencial os seus estados mentais (Astington & 
Barriault, 2001; Martins, Osório, & Macedo, 2008). O uso do constructo “teoria” não 
pretende sugerir que as crianças pensem acerca do mundo mental como “pequenos cientistas”. 
No entanto, estas recorrem efectivamente a um sistema de inferências sócio-cognitivo 
(Lillard, 1998b) apoiado numa estrutura coerente de conceitos que as auxiliam na 
compreensão de como a mente se traduz na acção humana (Wellman et al., 2001).  
Desde a sua emergência, o tópico da teoria da mente tem suscitado o interesse 
científico de investigadores provenientes de diferentes abordagens teóricas e com distintas 
posturas empíricas, aspecto que tem contribuído para o acumular de um vasto corpo de 
evidências. Não obstante, uma recente meta-análise (Wellman et al., 2001) encontrou 
evidências a favor da hipótese de um padrão desenvolvimental relativamente universal. Neste 
sentido, apesar dos diferentes países de origem e da variedade de tarefas utilizadas pelos 
estudos analisados, parece existir um período de transição durante a idade pré-escolar, 
caracterizado pela aquisição da noção da natureza subjectiva do conhecimento. Esta nova 
compreensão do mundo mental permite à criança recorrer a uma multiplicidade de estados 
internos (para além de desejos, também crenças e expectativas), extraordinariamente úteis 
para as explicações psicológicas quotidianas.  
 
 
Metodologias de Avaliação do Desenvolvimento da Cognição Social 
A exposição das características centrais dos marcos da cognição social permite, a 
partir deste momento, uma melhor compreensão dos objectivos que norteiam as metodologias 
de avaliação da atenção partilhada, do jogo simbólico e da teoria da mente. Foi tomada a 
opção de explicitar duas metodologias por marco, cujos objectivos, idades de aplicação, 
intervenientes e durações distintas de alguma forma reflectissem a diversidade de alternativas 
disponíveis aos investigadores. 
 
Avaliação da atenção partilhada. 
Escalas de Comunicação Social Precoce (Mundy et al., 2003). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
O objectivo principal da metodologia desenvolvida por Mundy e colaboradores (2003) 
é avaliar a capacidade de comunicação não verbal do bebé com um experimentador, 
incluindo-se aqui comportamentos indiciadores de atenção partilhada. Trata-se de uma 
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medida de observação estruturada, com a duração aproximada de 20 minutos, aplicável a 
bebés e crianças entre os 8 e os 30 meses de idade.  
 
Material e procedimento. 
O bebé deve estar sentado no colo do cuidador ou numa cadeira encostada a uma 
mesa, com o experimentador do lado oposto. Este deve colocar um conjunto de brinquedos na 
mesa e à vista da criança, embora fora do seu alcance. Nas paredes da sala devem estar 
expostos quatro posters coloridos (60 x 90), colocados de forma estratégica: dois deles a 60º, 
um à esquerda e outro à direita do bebé, e os restantes colocados a 150º do bebé, 
respectivamente atrás do seu ombro direito e esquerdo. O experimentador deve dar início à 
actividade apresentando os brinquedos ao bebé dizendo “Com o que queres brincar?” 
enquanto faz um gesto convidativo com as mãos. Os materiais disponíveis consistem em três 
brinquedos de corda e três brinquedos animados pelo experimentador. O bebé deve ser 
igualmente convidado a participar em brincadeiras de cócegas bem como em actividades 
lúdicas com recursos a brinquedos (por exemplo, um carrinho de brincar, um chapéu ou um 
livro de imagens). O experimentador deve ainda procurar direccionar a atenção do bebé para 
os posters na parede, usando a direcção do próprio olhar bem como do seu apontar. Todo o 
procedimento deve ser gravado em vídeo, captando simultaneamente a face do bebé bem 
como o perfil do experimentador.  
 
Cotação. 
O presente instrumento permite a avaliação de comportamentos de atenção partilhada, 
do cumprimento de pedidos comportamentais e do nível de interacção social. No caso 
específico da atenção partilhada, esta é avaliada mediante a ocorrência de dois tipos de 
comportamentos por parte do bebé: (a) iniciação de atenção partilhada (Initiating Joint 
Attention, IJA); e (b) resposta a sugestões de atenção partilhada (Responding to Joint 
Attention, RJA). Relativamente à iniciação de atenção partilhada, esta é caracterizada por 
comportamentos como alternar o olhar entre um brinquedo que manipula e a face do 
experimentador ou mostrar um brinquedo enquanto mantém contacto ocular. O nível de IJA 
do bebé é reflectido pela frequência com que os comportamentos acima descritos ocorrem ao 
longo de todo o procedimento. 
Relativamente às reacções do bebé às sugestões do experimentador, pretende avaliar-
se até que ponto o bebé centra o seu interesse no novo foco introduzido. Os comportamentos 
incluem seguir o apontar ou a linha de olhar do experimentador em direcção a um poster ou 
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brinquedo. Desta forma, o nível de RJA é definido pelo número de vezes que o bebé orienta o 
seu foco visual na direcção do olhar ou apontar do experimentador, dividido pelo número 
total de ensaios. No caso dos posters, o bebé deverá desviar o seu olhar em pelo menos 45º 
para a direita ou para a esquerda, ou mais de 90º nos ensaios relativos aos posters colocados 
atrás. 
 
Sistema de Cotação da Atenção Partilhada (Martins, 2003). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
O objectivo principal da metodologia desenvolvida por Martins (2003) reside na 
avaliação da ocorrência de diversos comportamentos de partilha de atenção entre o bebé e um 
adulto no último trimestre do primeiro ano de vida. Trata-se de um sistema de cotação 
aplicado a uma interacção lúdica semi-estruturada de 10 minutos de duração. 
 
Material e procedimento. 
O bebé deve estar sentado numa cadeira em frente a uma mesa ao nível da sua cintura 
e com o adulto à sua esquerda. Para que seja possível captar os movimentos e expressões 
faciais do adulto ao longo da interacção, deve colocar-se um espelho à direita do bebé. Este 
reflectirá a face do adulto. Em seguida, apresenta-se à díade um brinquedo que seja 
simultaneamente interessante e desafiante para o bebé (i.e., um pouco acima do seu nível 
desenvolvimental), o que potencialmente elicitará orientações e/ou demonstrações por parte 
do adulto. Por exemplo, nos seus trabalhos, Martins (2003) usou um camião de madeira com 
três encaixes para três bonecos coloridos. Relativamente às instruções, estas devem ser claras 
mas não demasiado directivas: “Brinque com o(a) [nome da criança] usando este brinquedo. 
Tente ver o que ele(a) consegue fazer.” De seguida, e durante 10 minutos, o adulto e o bebé 
são deixados sozinhos com a câmara a filmar a partir do interior da sala. 
 
Cotação. 
A atenção partilhada é avaliada mediante a ocorrência de três situações: (a) episódios 
de atenção partilhada (duração); (b) reacções do bebé às estratégias do adulto para 
direccionar a sua atenção (frequência); e (c) estratégias do bebé para direccionar a atenção 
do adulto (frequência).  
Relativamente aos episódios de atenção partilhada, estes ocorrem quando existe 
coordenação da atenção de ambos os elementos da díade para um objecto externo. Para que 
tal se verifique, são necessárias três condições sine qua non: presença de atenção coordenada 
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(isto é, ambos olham para o mesmo objecto), troca de olhares entre o bebé e o adulto em 
algum momento, e o episódio ser de valência emocional positiva ou neutra (pois episódios de 
conflito evidenciam um desencontro de intenções). Deve registar-se o período de tempo 
durante o qual a díade partilha a atenção, terminando assim que um dos elementos quebrar o 
episódio, por exemplo, focando a sua atenção num outro objecto. As duas restantes categorias 
são cotadas em termos da sua frequência. À semelhança do que foi descrito para a categoria 
anterior, é essencial que em algum momento antes, durante, ou após cada uma das situações 
abaixo apresentadas, o bebé alterne o olhar entre a face do adulto e o foco da atenção em 
comum. Ao nível das reacções do bebé às estratégias do adulto, pretende avaliar-se até que 
ponto o bebé partilha o seu interesse no novo foco introduzido por este, ou se, pelo contrário, 
ignora os seus esforços ou atende unicamente ao objecto (não alternando o olhar). 
Habitualmente, as estratégias dos adultos passam por criar envolvimento através do contacto 
(ex. cócegas e toques com o brinquedo); animar um brinquedo (ex. bater, agitar ou mexer o 
brinquedo para criar interesse no bebé; jogos de “dá-e-tira” ou “esconde-esconde” com o 
brinquedo); mostrar ou apontar; e demonstrar ou sugerir uma acção com o brinquedo. 
Finalmente, em termos de estratégias do bebé para direccionar a atenção do adulto, o intento 
será detectar três tipos de comportamentos: animar o brinquedo (ex. quando o bebé agita 
brinquedos no ar ou bate com brinquedos na mesa); oferecer o brinquedo ao adulto; e apontar 
para o brinquedo (natureza comunicativa ou não-comunicativa). Tal como anteriormente, 
todos estes comportamentos implicam que, a dada altura, o bebé olhe para a face do adulto. A 
única excepção será a ocorrência do apontar não comunicativo, em que o gesto convencional 
de apontar (dedo indicador esticado) não é acompanhado de troca de olhares. 
  
Avaliação do Jogo Simbólico Social. 
Tarefa de Jogo Simbólico (Meins & Russell, 1997). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
Meins e Russell (1997) desenvolveram uma interacção lúdica estruturada entre a 
criança e o experimentador cujo objectivo é avaliar a capacidade da criança de adaptar o seu 
jogo simbólico de acordo com as sugestões de um adulto. A tarefa tem a duração aproximada 
de 15 minutos e é apropriada para crianças entre os 2 ½ aos 3 ½ anos de idade. 
 
Material e procedimento. 
O experimentador começa por apresentar à criança um conjunto de objectos, dois 
deles representacionais (uma boneca e um carrinho) e nove não representacionais (ex. um rolo 
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interior de papel higiénico, uma tampa de garrafa de água, um guardanapo azul). A partir do 
momento em que a criança demonstrar estar já familiarizada com os objectos (ou cerca de 5 
minutos depois), retiram-se os objectos da mesa para, seguidamente, serem apresentados 
sequencialmente e em pares compostos por um brinquedo representacional (ex. carro) e um 
objecto não representacional (ex. rolo). É então pedido à criança que realize actividades com 
cada par de objectos de acordo com a sequência seguinte: (a) “O que podes fazer com isto?” 
(condição elicitada). Após a resposta da criança, ou na sua evidente ausência, o 
experimentador coloca a seguinte questão (sem apontar para os objectos e sem modelar 
qualquer acção): (b) “Faz o carro andar no túnel” (exemplo de condição instruída para o par 
carro e rolo). A apresentação dos pares é sequencial e aleatória. 
 
Cotação. 
As tarefas realizadas pela criança dão origem a uma pontuação denominada de 
capacidade executiva (Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984). Meins e Russell (1997) adaptaram 
este conceito enquanto medida quantitativa que permite avaliar a capacidade da criança de 
incorporar as sugestões de outrem no seu jogo simbólico. Para o seu cálculo, é atribuída uma 
classificação de 0 (menor sofisticação) a 4 (maior sofisticação) para as actividades que a 
criança realizar com cada par, em ambas as condições (elicitada e instruída). No exemplo 
apresentado, a criança recebe uma pontuação de 0 se brincar apenas com o carrinho; obtém 2 
pontos se segurar o tubo na vertical (90º com a mesa) e deixar o carro cair para dentro; e 
poderá alcançar a pontuação máxima de 4 se colocar o tubo na posição horizontal, empurrar o 
carro para dentro do “túnel” e o fizer sair do outro lado. A capacidade executiva é então 
calculada a partir da diferença entre a média das pontuações relativas às condições instruídas 
e elicitadas, em função de um valor que expressa a média dos níveis acima dos obtidos pela 
criança em cada condição elicitada: 
 
 
 
De acordo com Meins e Russel (1997), valores mais elevados de capacidade executiva 
traduzem uma maior capacidade da criança de integrar as sugestões de um experimentador em 
sequências mais sofisticadas do jogo simbólico. 
 
 
 
Média condições instruídas – Média condições elicitadas 
 
 
 
Média níveis acima dos obtidos nas condições elicitadas 
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Sistema de Cotação do Jogo Simbólico (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
Nielsen & Dissanayake (2000) desenvolveram um sistema de cotação que avalia a 
ocorrência bem como a duração de comportamentos de jogo simbólico. Trata-se de uma 
grelha aplicável a uma sessão de interacção não estruturada entre criança e mãe ou pai. A 
tarefa utilizada originalmente pelos autores teve a duração de 30 minutos e foi administrada a 
crianças entre os 3 e os 4 ½ anos de idade. 
 
Material e procedimento. 
O experimentador convida a criança e a mãe ou o pai a brincarem com um conjunto de 
brinquedos que encorajem o jogo simbólico (ex. bonecos de ambos os géneros, serviço de chá 
de brincar, telefone de brincar, comidas de plástico, entre outros). Esta actividade foi 
originalmente administrada em contexto laboratorial, numa sala equipada apenas com o cesto 
contendo os brinquedos. Todo o procedimento deve ser gravado em vídeo, de forma a captar 
as acções e verbalizações tanto da criança como do adulto. 
 
Cotação. 
Cada instância de jogo simbólico levada a cabo pela criança é cotada de acordo com 
seis categorias definidas com base na literatura (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Lillard, 1993; 
Ungerer & Sigman, 1981; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995): (a) Substituição de objecto, na qual a 
criança designa um objecto como sendo outro (ex. pega num lápis e diz “Isto é uma espada”) 
ou usa um objecto de uma forma não convencional (ex. usa uma chávena como telefone); (b) 
Jogo imaginário, em que a criança cria objectos ou pessoas sem que estes tenham uma 
representação física no meio imediato (ex. a criança finge estar a beber “chá” com a mãe/pai, 
e deita o chá imaginário; a criança tem uma conversa telefónica imaginária com um amigo 
ausente); (c) Atribuição de características animadas, a criança atribui vida própria a objectos 
inanimados (ex. falar pela boneca ou falar com a boneca como que esperando que esta 
responda); (d) Atribuição de papéis, na qual a criança atribui verbalmente, e de forma 
explícita, um papel de faz-de-conta a si, a um objecto (ex. boneca) ou à mãe/pai (ex. “Agora 
tu fazes de Senhor Doutor”). No entanto, não é necessário que a criança participe na 
actividade nem que o papel seja cumprido; (e) Role Play, a criança encena o papel atribuído 
(ex. fazendo de conta que é uma mãe que está a alimentar o seu bebé). Nesta categoria não é 
necessário que a criança verbalize o papel que está a adoptar; (f) Propostas conjuntas, esta 
categoria é cotada quando a criança faz referência a si e ao adulto na mesma frase (ex. “Tens 
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que me deitar o chá na minha chávena”; “Agora vamos jantar”). De salientar que esta 
categoria apenas poderá ser cotada durante as situações de jogo simbólico, e não quando a 
criança faz sugestões não simbólicas (ex. “Vamos brincar para ali”). 
As categorias (b), (c) e (e) são cotadas de acordo com a sua frequência e duração, 
enquanto as categorias (a), (d) e (f) são cotadas apenas em termos de frequência. De salientar 
que as categorias não são mutuamente exclusivas, podendo uma categoria ser cotada em 
simultâneo com outra (por exemplo, fazer de conta que toma “chá” enquanto finge ser a 
“mãe”). 
 
Avaliação da Teoria da Mente. 
Considerações metodológicas prévias. 
A noção de que as pessoas podem pensar e agir com base em expectativas que diferem 
da realidade (crenças falsas) tem sido considerada como o primeiro sinal da aquisição 
consolidada de uma teoria da mente (Hala & Carpendale, 1997). Embora as tarefas que 
avaliam a crença falsa constituam uma prova fundamental e informativa sobre a compreensão 
da representação mental por parte das crianças, este não constitui o único tipo de tarefa que 
avalia esta capacidade. Ao longo dos últimos anos têm sido desenvolvidas metodologias que 
se centram na avaliação de outros aspectos também relevantes para a teoria da mente, como, 
por exemplo, a compreensão de desejos (Wellman & Liu, 2004), emoções (Parker, 
MacDonald, & Miller, 2007), ou conhecimento de outrem (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Contudo, por se tratar de um tipo de prova relativamente consensual entre os 
investigadores, optamos por apresentar dois exemplos clássicos de provas de avaliação da 
compreensão da crença falsa que têm sido largamente usados na investigação na área do 
desenvolvimento sócio-cognitivo na idade pré-escolar.  
Salientamos ainda três questões metodológicas a reter a propósito da avaliação da 
teoria da mente: (i) na medida em que estamos perante testes de resposta dicotómica, é 
aconselhável a administração de múltiplas tarefas. A vantagem de usar uma bateria de provas 
reside na diminuição do impacto de eventuais respostas ao acaso, servindo ainda para 
aumentar a diferenciação entre as crianças (Wellman et al., 2001); (ii) sugerimos igualmente a 
inclusão de provas prévias de controlo da memória e de linguagem, pois tais factores 
influenciam o desempenho nestas tarefas (Astington, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). 
Kerr e Durkin (2004) propõem uma metodologia relativamente rápida e simples que, quando 
aplicada antes das provas de avaliação da teoria da mente, permite ao examinador perceber se 
a criança detém os níveis adequados de linguagem e de memória para que seja capaz de 
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acompanhar as narrativas apresentadas. Outros autores optam por incluir questões de controlo 
na própria tarefa da crença falsa (e.g., Meins et al., 1998; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) 
com o mesmo objectivo de assegurar que eventuais insucessos sejam, efectivamente, fruto de 
imaturidade sócio-cognitiva; (iii) a par de uma avaliação experimental da teoria da mente, é 
conveniente efectuar avaliações naturalistas da mesma, na medida em que o desempenho de 
uma criança em contexto experimental nem sempre nos revela a sua total capacidade sócio-
cognitiva. Por vezes, as crianças demonstram melhor a sua compreensão a nível mental em 
contexto familiar (Astington & Barriault, 2001). 
 
Tarefa da Transferência Inesperada (adaptado de Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
No seu estudo pioneiro, Heinz Wimmer e Josef Perner (1983) debruçaram-se sobre o 
desenvolvimento de um paradigma que testasse a presença da compreensão da crença falsa 
em crianças dos 3 aos 9 anos. A tarefa apresentada em seguida é uma versão abreviada da 
original, tendo a sua aplicação uma duração aproximada de 10 minutos e cuja estrutura tem 
sido amplamente utilizada em investigação. 
 
Material e procedimento. 
Para a sua administração são necessários dois pequenos bonecos com características 
humanas (representando uma mãe e o seu filho), duas caixas opacas de cores diferentes e um 
chocolate de brincar. O experimentador, utilizando os materiais, encena a seguinte situação: 
um menino coloca o seu chocolate numa caixa (A) e sai para a escola. Posteriormente, a mãe 
tira o chocolate da caixa A, usa algum para um bolo e guarda-o na caixa B. Informa-se a 
criança de que o menino, ao regressar, vai querer comer o chocolate. Exposto este cenário, são 
introduzidas as seguintes questões de controlo: “Onde é que estava o chocolate no início?” 
(questão de memória); “Onde é que está o chocolate agora?” (questão da realidade). De 
salientar que apenas se a criança responder correctamente às questões de controlo é que 
poderá ser considerada a resposta à questão de teste, caso contrário o investigador não pode 
ter a certeza de que está efectivamente a avaliar a crença falsa. Por fim, é colocada a questão 
de teste: “Onde é que o menino vai procurar o chocolate dele?” (questão de teste) 
 
Cotação. 
Relativamente à questão de teste, caso a criança responda que o menino vai procurar o 
chocolate onde o deixou (porque não sabe da transferência) considera-se que teve sucesso na 
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tarefa. Se, pelo contrário, a criança responder que o menino irá procurar o chocolate onde este 
se encontra actualmente, deverá considerar-se como insucesso, na medida em que a criança 
ainda não revela a noção de que o comportamento humano é balizado pelo conhecimento que 
possuímos acerca da realidade.  
 
Tarefa do Conteúdo Inesperado (adaptado de Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
Objectivo principal e características gerais. 
Visando o mesmo objectivo de avaliar a compreensão dos estados mentais 
representacionais através da crença falsa, Perner e colaboradores (1987) desenvolveram, com 
base no trabalho prévio de Hogrefe, Wimmer e Perner (1986), a tarefa do conteúdo 
inesperado. Em contraste com o anterior, o presente procedimento avalia a crença falsa que 
será induzida na própria criança em avaliação, o que permite também avaliar a noção que esta 
tem acerca dos próprios estados mentais. O tempo de administração é de cerca de 10 minutos. 
 
Material e procedimento. 
O material comporta apenas um recipiente, tipicamente associado a um determinado 
conteúdo e facilmente identificável por crianças em idade pré-escolar (ex. um tubo de 
chocolates – “Pintarolas”), no qual deverá colocar-se algo de inesperado (ex. lápis). O 
experimentador começa por mostrar à criança o tubo de chocolates fechado e a questioná-la 
sobre o que ela pensa estar no interior do mesmo. Após resposta de acordo com o conteúdo 
típico (“chocolates” ou “Pintarolas”), o experimentador abre o tubo e a criança descobre que, 
na realidade, este contém lápis. Depois de o voltar a fechar, a criança tem de responder a uma 
questão de controlo: “Lembras-te do que está aqui dentro?”. Segue-se a primeira questão de 
teste, sobre o que a própria criança pensava estar no tubo inicialmente. Para terminar a tarefa 
é colocada uma última situação: chamando uma pessoa ausente, o que pensará ela estar dentro 
do tubo? As respostas são elucidativas do nível de consolidação da teoria da mente, visto 
reflectirem a (in)capacidade das crianças de recordarem as suas crenças falsas prévias, bem 
como de perceber que os outros podem ter crenças falsas acerca da realidade (i.e., sobre o 
verdadeiro conteúdo da caixa de chocolates). 
 
Cotação. 
Relativamente à cotação, para a primeira questão (própria crença falsa) considera-se 
como sucesso o reconhecimento, por parte da criança, de que inicialmente acreditou que o 
recipiente continha chocolates. Pelo contrário, uma resposta que indique que a criança 
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acreditava desde o início que o recipiente continha lápis deve ser cotada como insucesso. A 
resposta à segunda questão (crença falsa do outro) é cotada de forma semelhante: sucesso se a 
criança atribuir ao outro a crença de que o recipiente contém chocolates e insucesso caso ela 
não seja capaz de imputar-lhe uma crença falsa. Perner e colaboradores (1987) consideram as 
seguintes contingências de resposta: ambas as respostas correctas; apenas correcta a questão 
relativa à própria crença falsa; apenas correcta a questão relativa à crença falsa do outro; 
ambas incorrectas. 
A Tabela 1 resume as principais características das metodologias descritas. 
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Tabela 1 
 Metodologias de Avaliação da Cognição Social da Infância à Idade Pré-escolar 
 
 Atenção Partilhada Jogo Simbólico Social Teoria da Mente 
D
e
s
i
g
n
a
ç
ã
o
 
Escalas de Comunicação Social 
Precoce 
(Mundy et al., 2003) 
Sistema de Cotação da Atenção 
Partilhada (Martins, 2003) 
Tarefa de Jogo Simbólico 
(Meins & Russell, 1997) 
Sistema de Cotação do Jogo 
Simbólico (Nielsen & 
Dissanayake, 2000) 
Tarefa da Transferência 
Inesperada 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
Tarefa do Conteúdo 
Inesperado 
(Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 
1987) 
I
d
a
d
e
 
8-30 Meses A Partir dos 9 Meses 2 ½ - 3 ½ Anos 3 – 4 ½ Anos 4-5 Anos 4-5 Anos 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
o
 Avaliação dos comportamentos 
de atenção partilhada numa 
tarefa estruturada 
Avaliação dos comportamentos 
de atenção partilhada numa 
tarefa semi-estruturada 
Avaliação da capacidade de 
integração das sugestões 
simbólicas de um 
experimentador 
Avaliação dos comportamentos 
simbólicos em interacção com o 
progenitor 
Avaliação da noção da crença 
falsa alheia – indicadora da 
presença da Teoria da Mente 
Avaliação da noção da crença 
falsa própria e alheia – 
indicadoras da presença da 
Teoria da Mente 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
i
e
n
t
e
s
 
Bebé 
Experimentador 
Bebé 
Progenitor 
Criança 
Experimentador 
Criança 
Progenitor 
Criança 
Experimentador 
Criança 
Experimentador 
D
u
r
a
ç
ã
o
 
20 Minutos 10 Minutos 15 Minutos 30 Minutos 10 Minutos 10 Minutos 
 124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
125 
 
Conclusão 
O desenvolvimento da cognição social tem sido, nas últimas décadas, mote para 
a publicação de uma extensa e variada gama de estudos. A emergência de trabalhos 
empíricos, associada ao esforço crítico de inúmeros trabalhos de revisão teórica, 
incluindo várias meta-análises, oferece um conhecimento cada vez mais aprofundado de 
uma temática tão relevante e complexa. Em particular, a literatura tem esclarecido quais 
as fases do desenvolvimento sócio-cognitivo normativo, salientando de forma 
consistente três marcos: a atenção partilhada (último trimestre do primeiro ano de vida); 
o jogo simbólico social (por volta dos 3 anos de idade); e a teoria da mente (entre os 4 e 
os 5 anos de idade). 
O presente trabalho teve, como ponto de partida, um duplo objectivo. Por um 
lado, procurou dotar o leitor de uma breve descrição teórica acerca do desenvolvimento 
da compreensão da mente e do comportamento humano da infância à idade pré-escolar, 
aludindo aos três marcos desenvolvimentais descritos. Por outro lado, e numa vertente 
mais prática, pretendeu disponibilizar exemplos de metodologias de avaliação com 
objectivos, idades de aplicação, intervenientes e durações distintas. Assim, julgamos 
que este artigo poder-se-á constituir como um apoio à investigação na área, na medida 
em que alia perspectivas teóricas e sugestões de avaliação prática dos marcos 
normativos da cognição social nos primeiros anos de vida. 
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